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ABSTRACT 
 Most decision models focus on the role of expected value. However, gain-loss 
frequency, that is how often gains versus losses are experienced, is another important 
aspect of choice behavior. In decision from experience paradigms, people make choices 
and receive a series of gains and/or losses as feedback, and hence gain-loss frequency is 
salient in this decision context. Also, much research indicates that people are highly 
sensitive to frequency information. Thus, people might rely on gain-loss frequency to 
make decisions. This work examined whether and how people use frequency 
information in experience-based decision-making and further investigated some 
important psychological and developmental aspects of using frequency information. In 
Study 1, a frequency heuristic where people track the frequency of gains and losses and 
choose the option with frequent gains and rare losses was formalized, and an 
Expectancy-Frequency-Perseveration (EFP) model which accounts for this frequency 
heuristic was developed. In different decision-making paradigms and on various model 
performance criteria, EFP models consistently performed well and often outperformed 
other models without the frequency value component in terms of fitting human choice 
behavior, suggesting a crucial role of frequency information and the pervasiveness of the 
frequency heuristic in experience-based decision-making. Study 2 investigated the role 
of working memory (WM) in the use of the frequency heuristic. This study manipulated 
WM load and employed a decision-making task where the frequency heuristic is 
counterproductive. Behavioral results showed that participants with intact WM resources 
were biased towards options with frequent gains and rare losses (but with lower expected 
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values), compared to those under WM load, indicating that WM load reduces reliance on 
gain-loss frequency. Consistent with the behavioral results, computational modeling 
results suggest that WM load diminishes attention to the frequency information. Thus, 
Study 2 provides evidence that WM contributes to the use of the frequency heuristic. 
Study 3 replicated these main results from Study 2. Furthermore, Study 3 reveals that at 
least one role of WM is to contribute towards making accurate gain-loss frequency 
judgments, which in turn could form a basis for applying this heuristic. Study 4 revealed 
a life-span trajectory of the use of the frequency heuristic, that is, people tend to utilize 
the frequency heuristic more with advancing age. Hence, it appears that the WM demand 
for using the frequency heuristic is not so strong that normal (healthy) age-related 
cognitive decline would constrain the use of it. These seemingly contradictory findings 
suggest a moderate WM demand for applying this heuristic. The “irregular” position of 
the frequency heuristic on the map of the dual-process models and its implications are 
discussed.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Decision-making is a critical part of everyday life, from minor decisions such as 
whether to pick a new restaurant for dinner or eat at one you frequently visit to major 
ones such as choosing the right college. Most decision theories hold that decisions are 
made based on each option’s expected value, the payoff value that an option is expected 
to yield. Besides expected value, another important aspect of an option is the frequency 
of gains and losses that it yields or the frequency of positive versus negative experiences 
that it brings. Frequency information might also be important in decision-making. The 
present work was intended to investigate the role of frequency information in decision-
making.  
1.1 Dominating Role of Expected Value in Decision-Making Theories  
In decision-making research, researchers ask participants to work on various 
decision-making tasks to investigate how people make decisions. These decision-making 
tasks are based on two major paradigms. One is decisions from description where 
participants are explicitly given possible outcomes of each alternative and corresponding 
probabilities. For example, consider the choice between a gamble with a 75% chance to 
win $1000 (with a 25% chance to win nothing) and the option of obtaining $700 for 
sure. Choice behavior in decisions from description is often modeled by prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) which assumes that decision makers form and compare 
expected utilities for alternatives and choose the one with the highest expected utility. In 
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the example described above, prospect theory assumes that a decision maker compares 
expected subjective utilities, 𝜋(1000)×𝜔(0.75) 𝑣𝑠. 𝜋(700)1.  
Recently, another paradigm, decisions from experience, has attracted 
continuously growing attention (e.g., Hertwig, 2012; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 
2004; Hills & Hertwig, 2010). By contrast to description-based decision-making, in this 
context, participants have no access to outcome distribution information (i.e., potential 
outcomes and probabilities to obtain them) at the beginning of the task, but have to learn 
it by making repeated choices and gaining feedback or experience. Despite some marked 
differences in choice behavior between description-based and experience-based 
decision-making (see Hertwig & Erev, 2009, for a review), many theories on decisions 
from experience assume that people track expected values through certain learning 
mechanisms such as reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998) across trials, and 
choose the option that produces the highest expected value. Therefore, existing decision 
theories emphasize the role of expected value in both description-based and experience-
based decision-making.  
1.2 Sensitivity to Frequency Information  
Frequency of occurrence is a fundamental aspect of experience that people 
regularly encode and is critical in a variety of behavior (Zacks & Hasher, 2002). 
Frequency processing is studied in a wide range of psychology areas such as learning 
(Sedlmeier, 2002), memory (Burgess, 1998), judgment (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), 
social cognition (Zajonc, 1968), and language (Aslin, Saffran & Newport, 1998). For 
                                                 
1 π and ω are psychophysical functions for outcome and probability, respectively.  
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instance, Aslin and colleagues (1998) indicates that babies’ sensitivity to the frequency 
of co-occurrence of different sounds is crucial in language acquisition. Also, people are 
more likely to make right judgments when information is presented in a frequency 
format compared to in a probability format (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). A large body 
of frequency processing literature centers on examining whether people can make valid 
frequency judgments. Most research suggests that people can make accurate frequency 
judgments for events in either everyday life (e.g., Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, 
Layman, & Combs, 1978; Shapiro, 1969) or laboratory events (e.g., Hintzman & Block, 
1971; Mutter & Goedert, 1997). For example, participants could accurately judge the 
frequency of presentation of words from a list (Hintzman & Block, 1971) and how often 
a sentence was repeated in a gist versus a verbatim form (Gude & Zechmeister, 1975). 
These findings indicate the importance of frequency information in human behavior and 
people’s deep sensitivity to it. 
1.3 Frequency Information in Decision-Making 
Although it is limited, some prior work provides evidence to support an 
important role of frequency information in decision-making. In a classical work, Zajonc 
(1968) found attitude enhancement of repeated exposure. For instance, increased 
frequency of presenting nonsense words was associated with enhanced affective 
connotation of the words, and increased presentation frequency of photographs led to 
enhanced favorability. Enhancement in attitude to an object might form the basis of a 
choice. 
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Another paper on consumer decision-making revealed that the number of 
positive and negative attributes that a brand possesses shapes consumers’ choices (Alba 
& Marmorstein, 1987). In a legal decision-making study, researchers examined real trial 
records of sentencing and examined how legal decision makers make sentencing 
decisions in theft, fraud, and forgery (von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). They found 
that actual sentences were best predicted by a cognitive mapping model which is based 
on counting the number of presence of factors from a penal code list for a criminal. 
These studies indicate a critical role of frequency information in consumer and legal 
decision-making. 
The two studies above are about description-based decision-making since all the 
attributes are presented to decision makers prior to their choices. A candidate task for 
examining how gain/loss frequency shapes behavior in decisions from experience is the 
Soochow Gambling Task (SGT).  Chiu and colleagues (2008) designed the SGT as an 
experience-based decision-making task, in which the effect of gain-loss frequency on 
performance directly contrasts with that of expected value. The decks with the best long-
term value give less frequent gains and more frequent losses than the decks with lower 
long-term values.  Chiu and colleagues found that most participants selected the options 
with higher gain frequency and lower loss frequency (but with lower expected values) 
rather than the options with higher expected values (but with rare gains and frequent 
losses). Hence, decision makers in some situations indeed use frequency information to 
make decisions, sometimes to their detriment.  
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1.4 Overview of Present Research 
Making a choice purely based on expected value appears to be rational since our 
goal is to maximize gains or pleasure and minimize losses or pain. Nevertheless, people 
might also use frequency information to make decisions. On the one hand, prior work 
demonstrates a critical role of frequency information in a wide range of human behavior 
(e.g., Burgess,1998; Sedlmeier, 2002; Aslin et al., 1998) and people’s great sensitivity to 
frequency information (e.g., Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Lichtenstein et al., 1978; 
Mutter & Goedert, 1997). On the other hand, in various decision contexts especially 
experience-based decision-making, frequency information such as gain-loss frequency is 
salient due to the decision context. For instance, in an experience-based decision-making 
task, people make choices and receive a series of gains and/or losses as feedback, and 
hence each option is associated with certain gain-loss frequency. Given these reasons, it 
is likely that frequency information could be a prominent factor in decision-making.  
The goal of the present research was to systematically investigate the use of 
frequency information in experience-based decision-making where frequency 
information is salient. Specifically, this work examined whether and how people use 
frequency information in experience-based decision-making and further investigated 
some important psychological and developmental aspects of using frequency 
information. Study 1 adopted a computational modeling approach to examine whether 
frequency information is used and how it is integrated into one’s decision. Having 
established the fundamental role of frequency information in decision-making, Study 2 
assessed the role of working memory (WM) in the use of a frequency heuristic in 
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decision-making. Study 3 sought to replicate the results from Study 2 and further 
examined whether WM would contribute to making accurate judgments on the gain-loss 
frequency information. Study 3 also evaluated the role of WM in frequency processing 
in a typical frequency processing task. Study 4 investigated life span change of the use 
of frequency information in decision-making. In the following sections, I overview each 
study and review relevant literature.  
1.4.1 Overview of Study 1 
A wide range of computational models have been proposed and established for 
experience-based decision-making (e.g., Ahn, Busemeyer, Wagenmakers, & Stout, 
2008; Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Erev & Roth, 1998; Worthy, Pang, & Byrne, 2013). 
Most models share some important characteristics such as using a prediction error, the 
difference between expected and actual outcomes, to update expected values for each 
option and make a choice based on a Softmax rule. For the purpose of the current work, 
the models of interest are roughly grouped into three categories. Models in the first 
category consider only expected value, that is, the tendency to choose an option with the 
highest expected value. Some examples are reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto, 
1998) and prospect valence learning models (Ahn et al., 2008; Steingroever, Wetzels, & 
Wagenmakers, 2014). The second type of models account for both expected value and 
perseveration which is the tendency to consecutively choose the same option over trials. 
The value-plus-perseveration (VPP) model (Worthy et al., 2013) is a typical example. 
Worthy et al. (2013) found that the VPP model outperformed the models considering 
merely expected value such as the PVL models, hence indicating an important role of 
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perseveration in accounting for choice behavior. The third type are models that also 
incorporate gain/loss frequency information.  These are the type of models that Study 1 
aimed to develop. These models consider three important factors that might contribute to 
decision-making: expected value, preservation, and frequency, and thus they are called 
Expectancy-Frequency-Perseveration (EFP) models.  
To assess the role of frequency information, a frequency heuristic was 
formalized. The basic idea is that one maintains a frequency value of each option while 
performing a decision-making task and the frequency value for an option increases by 1 
when a gain is received upon selecting an option and decreases by 1 when a loss is 
received. The frequency value decays over time to account for memory decay. It is 
referred to as a heuristic because it fits the key feature of heuristics: simplified rule-
based strategies which ignore part of the information (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; 
Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Using this frequency heuristic or relying on the gain-loss 
frequency value to make decisions ignores the magnitude of gains and losses. A 
computational model (the EFP model) with this frequency value component was built. I 
then applied the frequency heuristic-based model to three representative decision-
making paradigms which are widely used in recent experience-based decision-making 
research, and compared it to other established models without the frequency value 
component. If decision makers use frequency information, the EFP model would fit 
and/or predict their choice behavior better than other models.  
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1.4.2 Overview of Study 2 
Study 2 was intended to assess the role of working memory (WM) in the use of 
the frequency heuristic in experience-based decision-making. WM is a control system 
used for temporary storage and information manipulation with limits on both its storage 
and processing capabilities (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). It is crucial to a variety of higher-
order cognitive tasks (see Engle, 2002, for a review). WM might contribute to the 
decision-making processes in experience-based decision-making. Recently, a number of 
studies have examined the role of WM on choice behavior in a widely used decision-
making task, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 
1994). Turnbull and colleagues (2005) investigated the effect of WM on choice behavior 
in the original IGT by manipulating WM load with a dual-task paradigm but did not 
observe significant effects of WM load. Moreover, a recent review summarized 
correlational studies that examined the association between working memory capacity 
(WMC) and the IGT and found little evidence to support an association between them 
(Toplak, Sorge, Benoit, West, & Stanovich, 2010).  In contrast, other work does suggest 
that WM contributes to decision-making in IGT-like tasks. First, some evidence 
emerging from brain lesion and neuroimaging studies has indicated that normal 
functioning of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), widely thought to be a neural 
substrate of WM (Cohen et al., 1997; Jonides et al., 1993), is necessary for doing well in 
the IGT (Fellows & Farah, 2005; Li, Lu, D’Argembeau, Ng, & Bechara, 2010; Manes, 
Sahakian, Clark, & Rogers, 2002). Second, behavioral studies that employed variants of 
the IGT and manipulated WM load found that WM load impairs performance on these 
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tasks, implying that WM might contribute to IGT choices (Dretsch & Tipples, 2008; 
Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2002; Jameson, Hinson, & Whitney, 2004). Together, this 
line of research presents a mixed picture of the relation between WM and choice 
behavior in the IGT, but it seems that more evidence from studies manipulating WM 
load leans towards supporting the notion that WM contributes to choice behavior in IGT-
like tasks.  
However, the reward structure of the IGT limits its contribution to our 
understanding of the relation between WM and utilization of the frequency heuristic, 
because the effects of expected value and gain-loss frequency are confounded in the 
IGT. Hence, it would be unclear whether WM contributes to the use of expected value or 
frequency information in decision-making if an effect of WM load on the IGT 
performance is observed. In contrast, another experience-based decision-making task 
discussed earlier, the SGT, has a distinct reward structure which contrasts the effect of 
expected value directly against that of gain-loss frequency. In the SGT, choosing the 
advantageous decks yield frequent (but small) losses and infrequent (but large) gains, 
while the disadvantageous decks give rare (but large) losses and frequent (but small) 
gains. Thus, if focusing on the frequency of gains and losses, one would choose the bad 
decks more often and perform poorly. If WM load enhances SGT performance, it 
indicates that cognitive load reduces the utilization of the frequency heuristic; if WM 
load diminishes performance, it implies that cognitive load improves the use of the 
frequency heuristic. Hence, Study 2 used the SGT to examine the role of WM in the use 
of the frequency heuristic.  
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This heuristic appears simple but might be WM-sensitive. In prior studies (Otto, 
Taylor, & Markman, 2011; Worthy, Otto, & Maddox, 2012), it was found that a win-
stay-lose-shift strategy, which entails remembering the outcome (win or loss) of past 
trials and shares some similarity with the frequency heuristic, was predominant among 
participants without a concurrent WM-demanding task. In contrast, individuals who 
performed both a decision-making task and a concurrent task tended to prefer a strategy 
that implicitly integrated past outcomes. These results imply that tracking the gain-loss 
frequency and utilizing the frequency heuristic could be WM-intensive. 
In Study 2, WM load was manipulated by a dual-task paradigm such that one 
group of participants performed the SGT only, whereas another group of participants 
performed the SGT and a WM-demanding task concurrently. The effect of WM load on 
SGT performance would provide much insight into whether the utilization of a 
frequency heuristic is WM-dependent. Furthermore, Study 2 employed the EFP model 
developed in Study 1 to decompose the contribution of gain-loss frequency and expected 
value to choice behavior in the SGT, further delineating the underlying psychological 
mechanism. 
1.4.3 Overview of Study 3 
With respect to frequency processing, a large body of work has focused on a 
basic issue, frequency judgment (for a review, see Sedlmeier & Betsch, 2002). In typical 
studies, participants are asked to view a series of items, such as words, sentences, or 
pictures, which appear in different frequencies, and then to make a frequency judgment 
for each target item. Researchers are often interested in how accurate a judgment is and 
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what factors influence the accuracy. Some early work found that frequency judgment 
accuracy is invariant with respect to several factors, suggesting that people are highly 
sensitive to frequency information. Hasher and Zacks (1984) accordingly proposed that 
the processing of frequency information is effortless and automatic.  
Age is the first factor that is suggested to have no impact on frequency judgment 
accuracy. One child development study (Hasher & Zacks, 1979) compared children from 
kindergarten and grades 1, 2, and 3. Children were shown a list of pictures of familiar 
objects, occurring 1, 2, 3 or 4 times. Participants were then asked to judge the frequency 
of each object. The estimated frequency increased as a function of the actual frequency, 
but no clear difference in the judgment accuracy was observed across the four age 
groups. In a similar study, Attig & Hasher (1980) compared three groups of adults (mean 
ages are 22, 43, and 68 years) on the frequency judgment accuracy of a list of words 
with different frequencies of occurrence, and all age groups were found to be equally 
sensitive to frequency information. These studies suggest that cognitive functioning 
change with age does not impact frequency judgment, in contrast to typical findings of 
changes on most explicit memory tasks over age (e.g., Naito, 1990; Rovee-Collier, 
1997). Second, Zacks and colleagues (1982) compared college students from two 
universities with a 140-point difference in the verbal Scholastic Aptitude Test scores, 
and did not find a significant difference in frequency judgment accuracy between the 
two groups of students. Third, intention to code frequency information does not increase 
accuracy (Zacks, Hasher, & Sanft, 1982; Zechmeister, King, Gude, & Opera-nadi, 
1975). Instructing participants that they would be tested on frequency did not enhance 
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their accuracy compared to informing them that they would have a memory test, while 
giving test-appropriate instructions improved participants’ performance on a free recall 
memory test. Taken together, the evidence on the three factors supports the notion that 
frequency processing is automatic.  
However, the most important criterion supporting automaticity of an operation is 
the test under cognitive load manipulation (Jonides, 1981; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; 
Baddeley, 2012). Zacks and colleagues (1982) indeed reported a study which appeared 
to provide evidence to support that competing task demands did not reduce frequency 
judgment accuracy. They compared frequency judgment of three groups of participants 
who received different instructions. Participants were informed either a forthcoming 
recall test, a forthcoming frequency test, or both. Zacks and colleagues argued that 
participants who were told both upcoming tests were under a condition of higher 
cognitive load since they needed to prepare for both the frequency and the recall tests. In 
this study, they found that participants received different instructions, presumably with 
different levels of cognitive load while coding the frequency information, exhibited 
similar frequency judgment performance. Naveh-Benjamin and Jonides (1986), 
however, argued that the results of this experiment were problematic since preparation 
for a recall test would not be expected to impede frequency judgment if memory trace 
mediating recall also facilitates frequency judgment, which is likely to be the case. Thus, 
Naveh-Benjamin and Jonides (1986) manipulated cognitive load by asking participants 
to count either forward by 1’s (easy condition), backward by 3’s (medium condition) or 
backward by 11’s (hard condition). With this manipulation, they observed a clear effect 
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of cognitive load such that participants made more accurate judgments under the easier 
condition than those under the more difficult condition. In a similar study, Sanders and 
colleagues (1987) also found the interference effect of cognitive load on frequency 
judgment (Sanders, Gonzalez, Murphy, Liddle, & Vitina, 1987). Put together, it appears 
that frequency processing is not influenced by age, verbal ability, or intention.  However, 
the evidence of automaticity with respect to the central criterion, test under cognitive 
load manipulation, is somewhat mixed.  
Study 2 was intended to examine whether WM contributes to the utilization of 
frequency information in experience-based decision-making. If evidence supporting it is 
revealed, what remains unclear is whether WM load reduces the accuracy of gain-loss 
frequency estimation or if it interferes with other components of the process of using 
frequency information. Given that some work suggests that frequency judgment is 
automatic, it is possible that WM load does not impair frequency estimation but other 
components in the process such as integrating frequency information and expected 
value. One purpose of Study 3 was to investigate whether WM load would reduce 
frequency judgment accuracy in a decision-making task, thus causing a problem to 
utilizing the frequency information. A similar experimental procedure as Study 2 was 
adopted in Study 3. That is, one group of participants performed the SGT under a single 
task condition, while the other group did it under a dual-task condition. The key 
difference was that at the end of experiment, all participants were required to estimate 
the frequency of gains and losses for each deck, which allowed for investigating the 
effect of WM load on frequency judgment accuracy. The current findings on 
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automaticity of frequency judgment are mixed, but studies that manipulated cognitive 
load generally suggest that accurate frequency judgment requires cognitive resources. I 
thus hypothesized that WM load would impair the accuracy of gain-loss frequency 
judgment in the decision-making task. Additionally, Study 3 sought to replicate the 
results from Study 2. 
Study 3 also examined the effect of WM load on the frequency judgment 
accuracy in a word frequency judgment task, with an intention to add evidence to 
previous work suggesting that cognitive load impairs frequency judgment in classical 
frequency processing tasks. WM load was manipulated by the same dual-task paradigm 
as for the decision-making task. The last purpose of Study 3 was to compare the effects 
of WM load on frequency judgment in the typical frequency processing task, the word 
frequency judgment task, and the decision-making task. Decision-making is presumably 
a more complicated process than word frequency judgment. Thus, even if WM load does 
not reduce the judgment accuracy in the word frequency judgment task, it might 
diminish the accuracy in the decision-making task. Also, it is possible that frequency 
judgment is generally WM-demanding, and thus WM load would exhibit similar effects 
on judgment accuracy in the word frequency judgment task and decision-making task.  
1.4.4 Overview of Study 4 
Decision-making is a core competence in all ages. Understanding how decision-
making changes across the life-span is critical as older adults comprise an increasing 
proportion of the global population. For example, by 2030, it is estimated that there will 
be 72.1 million older persons who represent 19% of the US population, about one in 
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every 5 Americans. Given the potential importance of frequency heuristic in decision-
making, Study 4 was intended to evaluate the aging effects on the use of the frequency 
heuristic. 
Heuristics are often considered as simplified strategies or shortcuts that are used 
for effort reduction (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Age-
related cognitive decline (Park et al., 2002) can bias older adults towards heuristics in 
decision-making (Carpenter & Yoon, 2011; Mata, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007; Worthy 
& Maddox, 2012). For instance, older adults are more susceptible to the way how 
options are framed (i.e., framing effect) than younger adults (Kim, Goldstein, Hasher, & 
Zacks, 2005). The authors argued that diminished cognitive ability limits older adults’ 
information processing to superficial features of the problem (e.g., framing or the way 
the choices are described), resulting in susceptibility to choice framing. Also, older 
adults have a stronger satisficing tendency (Chen & Sun, 2003). This tendency is often 
associated with using heuristics since it only requires one to reach a satisfactory goal, 
whereas a maximizing tendency requires one to rely on systematic and deliberative 
processing to obtain the best outcome. Chen and Sun (2003) argued that older adults’ 
satisficing tendency is shaped by age-related cognitive decline. Furthermore, life 
experience can allow older adults to have access to more heuristics and thus use them 
more often, even when applying them is not adaptive (Castel, Rossi, & McGillivray, 
2012). In summary, age-related cognitive decline and life experience lead to enhanced 
use of heuristics with advancing age.  
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Study 4 also used the SGT which has a salient frequency component to examine 
the life-span change in the use of the frequency heuristic. Three group of adults, 
younger, middle-aged, and older adults, performed the SGT. Studies 2 and 3 examined 
the role of WM in the use of the frequency heuristic and I hypothesized that WM load 
would diminish its utilization. If the two studies find that the use of the frequency 
heuristic is not WM-demanding, it is very likely that older adults would use the 
frequency heuristic more than younger adults, as implied by older adults’ general 
preference to heuristics, and thus perform worse in the SGT. Nevertheless, if Studies 2 
and 3 reveal evidence supporting a WM-dependent nature of using the frequency 
heuristic, whether people use it more with advancing age might be reduced to the 
question of whether declined cognitive ability in older adults would constrain the use of 
the frequency heuristic. If it would, older adults might not be able to use it; if it would 
not, older adults might use it more often.  
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2. STUDY 1 
2.1 Overview of Study 1 
Prior work indicates that frequency information is critical in human behavior and 
people are highly sensitive to frequency information (see Sedlmeier, 2002, for a review). 
And the frequency of gains and losses (or of other task features) are salient in 
experience-based decision-making tasks. I thus propose that frequency information 
might be a fundamental component in experience-based decision-making. To test this 
possibility, Study 1 adopted a computational modeling approach, which could answer 
not only whether frequency information is used in experience-based decision-making but 
also how it is integrated into one’s decision. The Expectancy-Frequency-Perseveration 
(EFP) models were developed for three representative paradigms which are widely used 
in recent experience-based decision-making research. These EFP models are similar and 
all account for the three important factors in decision-making. Each model was only 
slightly adapted to accommodate each paradigm’s task features. The EFP models were 
compared to other established models for each task which do not include the frequency 
component.  
To rigorously compare these models, I adopted three methods for model 
comparison. First, models were fit to each participant’s choices trial-by-trial by a 
maximum likelihood method, and model fits were then compared to determine the model 
that provided the best post hoc fits. Second, best-fitting parameters from the first method 
were used to simulate choices, which were then compared to participants’ behavior to 
see which model generated choices that best mirrored participants’ behavior. The 
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simulation method is another common approach to assess the ability of a model to 
account for behavior (Steingroever, Wetzels, & Horstmann, 2013; Worthy et al., 2013). 
The third method is a generalization criterion method which compares models’ ability to 
make a priori predictions of new conditions (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). A model can 
perform greatly on fitting a training dataset when the model is excessively complex, 
whereas it might meanwhile perform poorly on making a priori predictions. The 
generalization method was used to detect this overfitting issue of a model. Given 
people’s sensitivity to frequency information and the salience of gain-loss frequency in 
experience-based decision-making, the prediction was that the EFP models would 
consistently perform better than other models without the frequency component.  
In each of the following sections, decision-making tasks of a paradigm and 
related research are briefly introduced, corresponding computational models are then 
specified, and finally model comparison results based on each method are presented.  
2.2 Paradigm 1: The Iowa and Soochow Gambling Tasks  
2.2.1 Task Description  
The Iowa Gambling Task2 (IGT) is perhaps the most popular decision-making 
task in the literature (Beitz, Salthouse, & Davis, 2014). It is often used as a 
psychological measurement of decision-making capacity. The IGT has been heavily 
utilized to examine choice behavior in various clinical populations (e.g., brain damage, 
substance abuse, neurodegenerative disease; for a recent review, see Buelow & Suhr, 
2009), developmental samples (e.g., Beitz, Salthouse, & Davis, 2014; Wood, 
                                                 
2 The findings on the role of WM in choice behavior in the IGT was discussed in Section 1.4.2.  
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Busemeyer, Koling, Cox, & Davis, 2005), and healthy adults (e.g., Fein, McGillivray, & 
Finn, 2007). In this task, players choose between four decks of cards, which yield both 
gains and losses. The reward schedule is shown in the top half of Table 1. Unbeknownst 
to players, Decks A and B are disadvantageous because they have a negative net 
expected value, while Decks C and D are advantageous because they have a positive net 
expected value. The task is initially challenging because the disadvantageous decks 
consistently yield larger gains (100 versus 50 points), yet they also provide larger losses, 
resulting in a negative net value. 
Although it is assumed that players make choices according to expected values 
for options in the IGT, critiques have been raised regarding the impact of gain-loss 
frequency (Chiu et al., 2008; Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006; Steingroever et al., 
2013). In the IGT, Decks A and C give frequent losses (on 50% of trials), while Decks B 
and D give less frequent losses (on 10% of trials). A tendency to avoid decks with 
frequent losses will not influence the net amount of points gained since the high-
frequency loss decks are evenly split across the advantageous and disadvantageous 
decks. The SGT was recently developed to further distinguish the influence of expected 
value and gain-loss frequency (Chiu et al., 2008). Its reward schedule is shown at the 
bottom of Table 1.  In this task the two advantageous decks (C and D) also give the most 
frequent losses – on 80% of trials compared to only 20% of trials for the 
disadvantageous decks. Thus, a tendency to avoid decks that give frequent losses will 
lead to poor performance, but a tendency to focus on the net long-term expected values 
of each deck will lead to good performance.  
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2.2.2 Model Description 
A range of computational models have been applied to the IGT and SGT data. 
Prospect valence learning (PVL) models and value-plus-perseveration (VPP) models are 
currently the most promising ones (Ahn et al., 2008; Steingroever, Wetzels, & 
Wagenmakers, 2015; Worthy et al., 2013). As with reinforcement learning (RL) models 
used broadly (Sutton & Barto, 1998), the basic assumptions behind the PVL models are 
that outcomes of past decisions are integrated to determine expected values for each 
option, and that decision makers tend to choose options with larger expected values than 
options with smaller expected values (Ahn et al., 2008). Specifically, the PVL-Delta 
model utilizes a Delta learning rule that assumes that the expected values for each option 
are recency-weighted averages of the payoffs received on each trial (Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972; Sutton & Barto, 1998); the PVL-Decay model uses a Decay learning rule 
which assumes that the expected values of all options decay over time (Erev & Roth, 
1998). The VPP model further accounts for both the tendencies to choose the option with 
the highest expected value and to perseverate or stay with the same option over 
consecutive trials (Worthy et al., 2013). Nevertheless, as discussed above, attention to 
gain-loss frequency is another important component of decision-making behavior. As 
such, this work developed the EFP model which accounts for attention to expected 
value, frequency of net losses versus gains, and perseveration, which I believe are three 
critical mechanisms underpinning behavior in decision-making tasks.  
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Table 1 Reward schedules for the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and Soochow 
Gambling Task (SGT) 
 
IGT Reward Schedule 
 Deck A Deck B Deck C Deck D 
1 100  100  50  50  
2 100 100  50  50  
3 100, −150 100  50, −50 50  
4 100  100  50  50  
5 100, −300 100  50, −50 50  
6 100  100  50  50  
7 100, −200 100  50, −50 50  
8 100  100  50  50  
9 100, −250 100, −1250 50, −50 50, −250 
10 100, −350 100  50, −50 50  
Net expected value -250 -250 250 250 
 
SGT Reward Schedule 
 Deck A Deck B Deck C Deck D 
1 200  100  −200  −100  
2 200 100  −200  −100  
3 200 100  −200 −100  
4 200  100  −200  −100  
5 −1050 −650  1050 650  
6 200  100  −200  −100  
7 200 100  −200 −100  
8 200  100  −200  −100  
9 200 −650 −200 −100 
10 −1050 100  1050 650  
Net expected value −500 −500 500 500 
Bold values indicate amount lost on each trial.  Decks A and B are disadvantageous in 
both tasks.  In the IGT decks A and C give high-frequency losses, while in the SGT the 
advantageous decks (C and D) give high-frequency losses.  See (Bechara et al., 1994) for 
the full table for the IGT which lists payoffs for the first 40 cards drawn from each deck. 
In the present task the sequence was repeated for cards 41–80 and 81–100 so that a 
participant could potentially select the same deck on all 100 draws. See (Chiu et al., 
2008) for the full table which lists payoffs for the first 40 cards drawn from each deck. In 
the present task the sequence was repeated for cards 41–80 and 81–100 so that a 
participant could potentially select the same deck on all 100 draws. 
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PVL Models 
The PVL-Delta and PLV-Decay models are often applied to choice data of the 
IGT and SGT (Ahn et al., 2008). The PVL models both have three components: a utility 
function, a value-updating rule, and an action-selection rule. However, the PVL-Delta 
model utilizes a delta rule (see below for details) for value-updating which updates only 
the expected value of the chosen option on each trial and leaves the values of the 
unchosen option unchanged. In contrast, the PVL-Decay model uses a decay rule (see 
below for details) which assumes that the expected values of all options decay over time. 
The PVL-Decay model also indirectly accounts for tendencies to perseverate because 
values for each deck tend to decay as they are selected less frequently (Worthy et al., 
2013).  The two models utilize the same utility function and action-selection rule. 
The prospect theory utility function assumes that the evaluation of each outcome 
follows the utility function derived from prospect theory (Ahn et al., 2008; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). The utility function has diminishing sensitivity to increases in 
magnitude, and different sensitivity to losses versus gains.  The utility, u(t), on trial t, of 
each net outcome, x(t), is: 
𝑢(𝑡) = {   𝑥(𝑡)
∝        𝑖f 𝑥(𝑡)≥0
−𝜆|𝑥(𝑡)|∝  𝑖f 𝑥(𝑡)<0
                                             (1) 
Here α is a shape parameter (0 < α < 1) that determines the shape of the utility 
function. As α approaches 1, utility increases in direct proportion to the outcome value. 
As it approaches 0, the utility function reduces to a stepwise function.  λ represents a loss 
aversion parameter (0 < λ<5) that governs the sensitivity of losses compared to gains. A 
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value of λ greater than 1 indicates that an individual is more sensitive to losses than 
gains, and a value less than 1 indicates greater sensitivity to gains than to losses. 
The value-updating rule determines how the utility 𝑢(𝑡) is used to update 
expected values or expectancies 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) for the chosen option, i, on trial t. The PVL-Delta 
rule utilizes the delta rule (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) which assumes that expectancies 
are recency-weighted averages of the rewards received for each option: 
𝐸𝑖(𝑡) =  𝐸𝑖(𝑡 − 1) +  𝜙 ∙ [𝑢(𝑡) − 𝐸𝑖(𝑡 − 1)]                                    (2) 
𝜙 represents the recency parameter (0 ≤ 𝜙 ≤ 1) that describes the weight given to 
recent outcomes in updating expectancies. As 𝜙 approaches 1, greater weight is given to 
the most recent outcomes in updating expectancies, indicating more active updating of 
expectancies on each trial. As 𝜙 approaches 0, outcomes are given less weight in 
updating expectancies. When 𝜙 = 0 no learning takes place, and expectancies are not 
updated throughout the task from their initial values. 
In contrast, the PVL-Decay model utilizes the decay rule (Erev & Roth, 1998) in 
which expectancies of all decks decay, or are discounted, over time. The expectancy of 
the chosen deck is then added to the current outcome utility: 
𝐸𝑖(𝑡) =  𝐴 ∙ 𝐸𝑖(𝑡 − 1) +  𝛿𝑖(𝑡) ∙ 𝑢(𝑡)                                            (3) 
The decay parameter A (0 ≤ A ≤ 1) determines the extent to which the past expectancy is 
discounted.  𝛿𝑗(𝑡) is a dummy variable that is 1 if deck j is chosen and 0 otherwise.   
The action-selection rule uses a Softmax rule (Sutton & Barto, 1998) to 
determine the predicted probability that deck j will be chosen on trial t, Pr[Gj(t)]: 
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𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑗(𝑡)) =
𝑒
𝜃(𝑡)∙𝐸𝑗(𝑡)]
∑ 𝑒
[𝜃(𝑡)∙𝐸𝑗(𝑡)]4
𝑗=1
                                                  (4) 
In the present work I utilize a trial-independent action-selection rule for all the 
RL models fit to the data: 
𝜃(𝑡) = 3𝑐 −  1                                                             (5) 
Here c (-5 ≤ c ≤ 5) represents the response consistency or exploitation parameter. A high 
value indicates that one’s choices are deterministic. A low value signifies more random 
responding over the course of the task. 
VPP Model 
The VPP model assumes that an individual keeps track of both expectancies and 
perseveration strengths for each deck (see Worthy et al., 2013). The expectancies (𝐸𝑗(𝑡)) 
for each j choice were computed according to Equations 1 and 2 above, the same as the 
PVL-Delta rule. The perseveration (𝑃𝑗(𝑡)) strengths for each j option were determined 
by a more general form of the decay rule that has previously been utilized to model 
perseveration or autocorrelation among choices (Kovach et al., 2012; Schönberg, Daw, 
Joel, & O’Doherty, 2007).  The perseveration term for chosen option i, on trial t, differs 
depending on whether the net outcome, x(t), was positive or negative: 
𝑃𝑖(𝑡)  = {
𝑘∙𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1)+ 𝜀𝑝𝑜𝑠      𝑖f 𝑥(𝑡)≥0
𝑘∙𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1)+ 𝜀𝑛𝑒𝑔     𝑖f 𝑥(𝑡)<0
                                       (6) 
Here k (0 ≤ k ≤ 1) represents a decay parameter similar to A in Equation 3 above for the 
PVL-Decay model.  The tendency to perseverate or switch is incremented, each time an 
option is selected, by 𝜀𝑝𝑜𝑠 and 𝜀𝑛𝑒𝑔 which vary between -1 and 1.  Positive values 
indicate a tendency to persevere by choosing the same option on succeeding trials, 
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whereas negative values denote a tendency to switch. The overall value of each option 
was determined by taking a weighted average of the two terms in the model, the 
expected value and the perseveration strength of each j option: 
𝑉𝑗(𝑡) =  𝑤𝐸𝑗 ∙ 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) +  (1 − 𝑤𝐸𝑗) ∙ 𝑃𝑗(𝑡)                                            (7) 
where 𝑤𝐸𝑗(0 ≤  𝑤𝐸𝑗 ≤ 1) quantifies the weight given to the expected value for each 
option. Values greater than .5 indicate greater weight given to the expected value of each 
option, and values less than .5 indicate greater weight based on the perseverative 
strength of each option. These values 𝑉𝑗(𝑡) were entered into a Softmax rule to 
determine the probability of selecting each option, j, on each trial, t, which is the same as 
Equations (4) and (5) above for the PVL models except that the VPP model utilizes 𝑉𝑗(𝑡) 
instead of 𝐸𝑗(𝑡). The direct inclusion of perseverative values is the major difference 
between the VPP model and the PVL models. The PVL-Delta model does not account 
for tendencies to perseverate or switch, while the PVL-Decay model account for these 
tendencies indirectly via the decay rule. 
EFP Model 
In contrast to the PVL models with a single expected value term and the VPP 
model with expected value and perseveration terms, the EFP model includes three terms 
to account for three critical components of choice behavior: expected value, gain-loss 
frequency, and perseveration. Increasing the number of terms may ostensibly improve 
the fit of the model or lead to overfitting simply because the model has too many 
parameters. Considering this, the EFP model was designed such that it captures these 
three important psychological components while being as parsimonious as possible.  
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The first model assumption is that after a choice is made and feedback (𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑡) 
and 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑡)) is presented, the utility 𝑢(𝑡) for the choice made on trial t is given by: 
𝑢(𝑡) =  𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑡) −  𝜌 ∙ |𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑡)|                                    (8) 
Here 𝜌3 represents a loss aversion parameter (0 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 5) that governs the sensitivity of 
losses compared to gains. A value of 𝜌 greater than 1 indicates that an individual is more 
sensitive to losses than gains, and a value less than 1 indicates greater sensitivity to gains 
than to losses. Note that the EFP model assumes that the subjective utility is linearly 
proportional to the actual payoff amount, in contrast to the PVL models that use a 
nonlinear function. One major reason for the nonlinear function in the PVL models is to 
indirectly account for the gain-loss frequency (Ahn et al., 2008). The EFP model directly 
captures sensitivity to gain-loss frequency (see below) and thus a shape parameter is 
unnecessary. Additionally, using a linear function improves the parsimony.     
The EFP model then assumes that the utility 𝑢(𝑡) is used to update expected 
values or expectancies 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) for the chosen option, i, on trial t, using a delta rule: 
𝐸𝑖(𝑡) =  𝐸𝑖(𝑡 − 1) +  𝜙 ∙ [𝑢(𝑡) − 𝐸𝑖(𝑡 − 1)]                             (9) 
Here 𝜙 represents the recency (or learning) parameter (0 ≤ 𝜙 ≤ 1) that describes the 
weight given to recent outcomes in updating expectancies. The utility function in the 
EFP model is the same as that in the PVL-Delta and VPP models.  
 
                                                 
3 Here 𝜌 has a similar meaning as 𝜆 in the PVL models. Since the EFP and PVL models have different 
utility functions, different letters for loss aversion are used to distinguish them.  
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The perseveration term in the VPP model was designed to model the tendency to 
perseverate following gains and to switch following losses. Thus, it also implicitly 
captures the frequency of gains and losses. The EFP model decomposes the tendency to 
select the option with infrequent losses and frequent gains and the tendency to 
perseverate. The frequency term for chosen option i, on trial t, differed based on whether 
the net outcome, x(t), was positive or negative: 
𝐹𝑖(𝑡)  = {
(1−𝜙)∙𝐹𝑖(𝑡−1)+1    𝑖f 𝑥(𝑡)≥0
(1−𝜙)∙𝐹𝑖(𝑡−1)−1     𝑖f 𝑥(𝑡)<0
                                     (10) 
The frequency value increases by 1 following a net gain or decreases by 1 
following a net loss. Instead of using a separate parameter to capture the weight to 
previous information as in the VPP model, the EFP model utilizes the term: 1 − 𝜙. Here 
𝜙 is the same as in Equation 9, accounting for weight given to recent information. Thus 
utilizing the same recency parameter for both the value updating function and the gain-
loss frequency function increases the parsimony of the EFP model and restricts the 
model to assume that attention to recent outcomes is the same for both value and 
frequency information.   
The perseveration term for chosen option i, on trial t, is determined by:  
𝑃𝑖(𝑡)  = 𝛾                                                              (11) 
The tendency to perseverate or switch is denoted by 𝛾 which varies between -100 and 
100. Essentially this perseveration term simply gives a bonus or a reduction to the value 
of the option that was selected on the last trial, and thus indicates a general tendency to 
stay or switch to a different option on each trial.  Note that in the VPP model tendencies 
to stay or switch were conflated with attention to the frequency of net gains versus 
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losses, while here the goal is to account for frequency and perseveration processes 
separately. 
The overall value of each option was determined by taking a weighted average of 
the expected value and the frequency value plus the perseveration strength of each j 
option: 
𝑉𝑗(𝑡) =  𝜔 ∙ 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) +  (1 − 𝜔) ∙ 𝐹𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑃𝑖(𝑡)                                      (12) 
where  𝜔 (0 ≤  𝜔 ≤  1) quantifies the weight given to the expected value for each option 
versus the weight given to the frequency of losses versus gains provided by each option.  
Finally, these overall values 𝑉𝑗(𝑡) were entered into a Softmax rule to determine 
the probability of selecting each option, j, on each trial, t:  
𝑃𝑟(𝐺𝑗(𝑡)) =
𝑒
𝜃(𝑡)∙𝑉𝑗(𝑡)]
∑ 𝑒
[𝜃(𝑡)∙𝑉𝑗(𝑡)]4
𝑗=1
                                                  (13) 
I utilize a trial-independent action-selection rule: 
𝜃(𝑡) = 3𝑐 −  1                                                             (14) 
Here c (-5 ≤ c ≤ 5) represents the response consistency or exploitation parameter. Lower 
values indicate more random responding over the course of the task.  
In sum, the EFP model has five parameters: (a) the recency parameter 𝜙; (b) the 
response consistency parameter c; (c) the weight of the expected value 𝜔 versus the 
weight to the frequency values; (d) the loss aversion parameter 𝜌; and (e) the 
perseverative tendency 𝛾. In comparison, the PVL models have four free parameters, 
while the VPP model has eight. 
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2.2.3 Method 1: Model Fits 
The EFP, VPP, PVL-Delta, and PVL-Decay models were first compared 
regarding their post hoc model fits. A Baseline model4 that assumes fixed choice 
probabilities was also considered (Gureckis & Love, 2009; Worthy & Maddox, 2012). 
To assess these models, I employed a large IGT dataset (n = 504) of healthy participants 
from 7 independent experiments that collected data on the 100-trial version of the IGT 
(Steingroever, Fridberg, et al., 2015). Each participant’s data were fit by maximizing the 
log-likelihood for each model’s prediction on each trial. Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC; Schwarz, 1978) was used to examine the relative fit of the model. BIC penalizes 
models with more free parameters. For each model, i, BICi is deﬁned as: 
BIC𝑖 = −2logL𝑖 + V𝑖log (n)    (15) 
where Li is the maximum likelihood for model i, Vi is the number of free parameters in 
the model, and n is the number of trials. Smaller BIC values indicate a better fit to the 
data. The EFP model exhibited the smallest average BIC value (see Table 2), indicating 
that the EFP model provides a better fit to the data than other models. Also, note that the 
PVL-Decay model fits were close to those of the EFP model, followed by the VPP 
model. The PVL-Delta model had a poorer fit compared to these models. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The baseline model has three free parameters that represent the probability of selecting Deck A, B, or C 
(the probability of selecting Deck D is 1 minus the sum of the other three probabilities).   
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Table 2 Average BIC values for each model for the IGT data 
Model EFP  VPP PVL-Delta PVL-Decay Baseline 
Mean(SD) 226.57(57) 229.93(56) 242.53(48) 227.95(57) 258.96(33) 
Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. Values in boldface are the minimum 
BIC values among these models. 
 
 
 
2.2.4 Method 2: Simulations 
BIC indicates only comparative performance of candidate models in a given set. 
Thus, even if all the candidate models fit poorly, BIC cannot issue a warning of it. The 
second model comparison method evaluated how choices simulated from candidate 
models using participants’ best-fitting parameters mimic human choices, which provides 
some evidence of the absolute performance of each model. 1000 simulations were run 
with each of the 504 sets of best-fitting parameter values. Each simulation generated a 
sequence of choices as a human participant. The proportion that each model selected 
each deck over the 100 trials was computed for each simulation and then an overall 
proportion of selecting each deck was computed for each model across all simulations, 
which indicates a model’s prediction of how often each deck will be selected. Figure 1 
displays the proportion of trials that participants and each model selected each deck. The 
EFP model’s simulated choices most closely mimic participants’ choices. The error bars 
for human choice behavior indicate 95% confidence intervals. Only the simulated 
proportions from the EFP model are consistently contained in these intervals. The EFP 
model produced almost the same proportion of selections of Decks A and B as did 
participants, while all other models under-predicted choices on Deck A and over-
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predicted choices on Deck B and these departures make their predictions be out of the 
95% confidence interval.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Observed and simulated choices of each deck. Simulations were run with 
each set of best-fitting parameter values. The error bars for human choice behavior 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
2.2.5 Method 3: Generalization Criterion Method 
The third method is a generalization criterion method which evaluates a model’s 
ability to make a priori predictions of new conditions (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). This 
method was applied to a data set from a within-subject experiment where each 
participant performed both the IGT and SGT with order counterbalanced (n = 58). Each 
  32 
model was first fit to the data for each task by maximizing the log-likelihood for each 
model’s prediction on each trial to obtain the best-fitting parameters. The best-fitting 
parameters estimated from the first task, either the IGT or SGT, were employed to 
generate an entire sequence of choices in the second task, either the SGT or IGT, 
respectively. The observed probability of choosing each option on each trial was 
calculated across all participants, while the predicted probability was computed across 
all participants’ simulation data. A mean square deviation score, comparing the observed 
and predicted probabilities, was computed for each model. A smaller difference score 
indicates better generalizability for a given model. Table 3 shows the results for this 
method. Clearly, the EFP and PVL-Decay model outperformed the VPP and PVL-Delta 
model when the IGT was used to predict the SGT. When the SGT was utilized to predict 
the IGT, the EFP and PVL-Decay model also exhibited slightly better generalizability 
than the other two models, although the four models all appeared to generalize well 
when predicting IGT performance from fits to SGT data. 
 
Table 3 Generalization criterion method outcomes for the IGT and SGT data 
Target task Model Estimated Task 
  
IGT SGT 
IGT 
EFP  33.49 
VPP  50.08 
PVL-Delta  72.81 
 PVL-Decay  34.12 
SGT 
EFP 22.80  
VPP 24.92  
PVL-Delta 26.82  
 PVL-Decay 22.83  
Values in boldface indicate the best model for each method in each condition. 
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2.3 Paradigm 2: Minimal Information Paradigm  
2.3.1 Task Description  
The second paradigm used to examine the frequency heuristic is a minimal 
information paradigm (Erev & Barron, 2005; Hertwig et al., 2004). It is often used to 
contrast with decisions from description. As discussed earlier, description-based decision 
problems are often given as simple gambles. Consider the following example,  
Choose between the two alternatives: 
5% chance to get $32 
50% chance to get $3 
In a minimal information task coupled with the description-based example given 
above, participants are also given two alternatives which have the same outcome 
distributions. However, they have no information about the outcome distributions and 
have to learn them through repeated choices and receiving feedback. Therefore, the only 
difference between the description-based and minimal information decision-making 
problems is the format of information presentation. This difference leads to a robust 
effect on choice behavior, which is called the description-experience gap (e.g., Camilleri 
& Newell, 2011; Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008; Hertwig et al., 2004). In 
particular, decision makers often overweight rare events when making decisions from 
description, while they tend to underweight rare events when making decisions from 
experience. For instance, in the above example, 5% chance to get $32 is a rare event, 
participants tend to overweight it and prefer this alternative when the decision problem is 
given in a description-based format; in contrast, participants tend to underweight it and 
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prefer the other alternative (50% chance to get $3) when they learn the outcome 
distributions through experience.  
Data from two minimal information tasks were used to investigate the frequency 
heuristic. Forty participants performed each task, and the data have not been published 
before. One task has two choices and the other has four choices. The two-choice task has 
two options with the same outcome distributions as the above example ($32, .05; $3, .5). 
The four-choice task was a modified version of the two-choice task that was derived by 
simply adding one of each type of option. Running two similar tasks allows for a 
generalization test for computational models. Behavioral results from both tasks 
replicated findings in the literature such that participants selected the option without rare 
events more often as if they underweighted rare events (e.g. Erev et al., 2010; Hertwig et 
al., 2004; Hills & Hertwig, 2010).  
2.3.2 Model Description 
For the minimal information paradigm tasks, a slightly modified EFP model was 
compared to a reinforcement learning (RL) model and a reinforcement learning plus 
perseveration (RLP) model, which have been often used to model choice data from the 
minimal information paradigm but do not take into account the frequency heuristic (e.g., 
Erev et al., 2010; Erev & Barron, 2005). The RL model assumes a delta learning rule 
with which it updates expected values 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) for each chosen option, i, on trial t: 
𝐸𝑖(𝑡) =  𝐸𝑖(𝑡 − 1) +  𝜙 ∙ [𝑥(𝑡) − 𝐸𝑖(𝑡 − 1)]                                    (16) 
𝜙 represents the recency parameter (0 ≤ 𝜙 ≤ 1) that describes the weight given to 
recent outcomes in updating expectancies. This value-updating function is similar to 
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Equation 2 which is used in the PVL-Delta model. But here the utility function is an 
identity function (instead of discounting outcome values with a shape parameter or 
weighing gains and losses differently with a loss aversion parameter). The expected 
values from Equation 16 are then entered in a Softmax rule function (4) to compute the 
probability of selecting each option.  
The RLP model additionally incorporated a perseveration term, 𝑃𝑡(𝑖). This term 
for option i is simply 1 if that option was chosen on the previous trial, and 0 otherwise: 
𝑃𝑖(𝑡)  = {
1,    𝑖f 𝑎𝑡−1= 𝑖
 0,    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                    (17) 
The EFP model was slightly modified for modeling the minimal information 
tasks. Both tasks only yield gains or no reward. A loss aversion parameter in the utility 
function (8) is unnecessary, and hence removed for parsimony. As such, (8) is reduced to 
an identify function, same as the RL and RLP models. Accordingly, the frequency term 
in the EFP model was changed such that the frequency term for chosen option i, on trial 
t, differed based on whether the outcome, x(t), was positive or zero: 
𝐹𝑖(𝑡)  = {
(1−𝜙)∙𝐹𝑖(𝑡−1)+1    𝑖f 𝑥(𝑡)>0
(1−𝜙)∙𝐹𝑖(𝑡−1)     𝑖f 𝑥(𝑡)=0
                                     (18) 
The frequency value increases by 1 following a gain or does not change following a zero 
outcome. Other aspects of the EFP model used for the minimal information tasks were 
the same as the one for the IGT and SGT. 
2.3.3 Method 1: Model Fits 
The EFP model was first compared to the RL model, the RLP model, and the 
baseline model on post hoc model fits. Each model was fit to each participants’ data by 
maximizing the log-likelihood for the model’s prediction on each trial, and an average 
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BIC value was computed for each model. Table 4 displays the average BIC value for 
each model. The EFP model exhibited the smallest BIC in both the two-choice task and 
four-choice task, indicating that the EFP model provides a better fit to the data than other 
models. Note that the RLP also provides a fairly good fit to the data. 
 
Table 4 Average BIC value for each model for the Minimal Information paradigm 
Model EFP  RLP RL Baseline 
Two-
Choice 
132.27(18.15) 135.70(18.24) 142.15(11.87) 133.35(13.38) 
Four-
Choice 
253.60(25.86) 259.78(28.29) 264.82(25.61) 273.60(45.52) 
Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. Values in boldface are the minimum 
BIC values among these models. 
 
 
2.3.4 Method 2: Simulations 
These models were then evaluated regarding their abilities to reproduce choices 
made by participants. The procedure was like the one for the IGT data. 1000 simulations 
were run with each set of best-fitting parameter values. Each simulation generated a 
sequence of choices. The proportion of trials that participants and each model selected 
the option with frequent gains was computed. In the calculation, the two options with 
frequent gains in the four-choice task were collapsed to facilitate comparison. Figure 2 
displays the proportion of trials that participants and each model selected the frequent 
gains option. The choices simulated from the EFP model mirrored participants’ choices 
better than did the RL model and RLP model. The problem of the last two models 
appears to be not considering participants’ tendency to choose an option with frequent 
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gains. Thus, it is understandable they under-predicted the proportion of trials that 
participants selected the frequent gains options. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Observed and simulated choices from the option(s) with frequent gains. 
Simulations were run with each set of best-fitting parameter values. The error bars 
for human choice behavior indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
2.3.5 Method 3: Generalization Criterion Method 
The EFP model’s ability to make a priori predictions of new conditions was 
evaluated against that of the RL and RLP models. The test procedure was the same as 
that used for the IGT and SGT data. The best-fitting parameters from the first task, either 
the two-choice or four-choice task, were utilized to simulate choices in the second task, 
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either the four-choice or two-choice task, respectively. A difference score, indicating a 
model’s prediction ability, was computed accordingly. Table 5 summarizes the 
difference scores for all models and both tasks. It is evident that the EFP model 
outperformed the other two models when the best-fitting parameters for the two-choice 
task data were used to predict choices on the four-choice task. From the four-choice to 
the two-choice task, the EFP and RL models did better than the RLP model. 
 
Table 5 Generalization criterion method results for the Minimal Information 
paradigm 
Target task Model Estimated Task 
  
Two-Choice Four-Choice 
Two -Choice 
EFP  20.58 
RLR  35.90 
RL  33.85 
Four -Choice 
EFP 31.25  
RLR 35.68  
RL 31.79  
Values in boldface indicate the best model for each method in each condition. 
  
  
2.4 Paradigm 3: Dynamic Decision Making Task 
2.4.1 Task Description  
In the previous two sections, results showed that frequency heuristic-based 
models outperformed other established models in terms of post hoc model fits, 
reproducing observed choices, and a priori predictions, indicating the significance of the 
frequency heuristic in experience-based decision-making. In the tasks that were 
examined in the previous sections, different alternatives have distinct frequencies of 
gains or losses. However, in some decision contexts, all alternatives produce gains or 
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losses with the same frequency. In these situations, the regular frequency heuristic is 
uninformative since all alternatives give gains or losses with the same frequency. 
Nevertheless, frequency of other task features could be informative and decision makers 
might employ them to make decisions.  
Here I examined a dynamic decision-making paradigm which has been widely 
used to investigate various aspects of decision-making behavior. In contrast to the 
previous two paradigms where payoff structure is static and hinges only on the current 
choices, in a dynamic decision making paradigm the payoff on a trial depends not only 
on the current choices but also on the choices made on previous trials. In particular, I 
utilized two published data sets from two similar tasks (Pang, Otto, & Worthy, 2015). 
This is the first time that computational models have been applied to these data. In both 
tasks, participants chose from two options on each trial. One option is a decreasing 
option which consistently produces a larger immediate reward, although selecting it 
causes future rewards for both options to decrease. The other option is an increasing 
option which, when selected, causes rewards for both options to increase on future trials.  
The only difference between the tasks is that in one task the two options have 
equivalent expected values (referred to as the Equal Task), while in the other task the 
decreasing option has higher expected value than the increasing option (referred to as the 
Decreasing Optimal Task). In both tasks, although choosing both options consistently 
yields rewards, selecting the increasing option results in an improvement on each trial 
before reaching its maximum; in contrast, choosing the decreasing option leads to a 
decrement on each trial before reaching its minimum. It is likely that participants might 
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track the frequency of positive changes, improvements, versus negative changes, 
decrements, and incorporate this information into their decision processes.   
2.4.2 Model Description 
To extend the EFP model for tracking the frequency of positive changes versus 
negative changes in payoffs, the frequency term was changed such that the frequency 
term for chosen option i, on trial t, differed based on whether the payoff change was 
positive or negative: 
𝐹𝑖(𝑡)  = {
(1−𝜙)∙𝐹𝑖(𝑡−1)+1    𝑖f 𝑥(𝑡)−𝐸𝑖(𝑡−1)≥0
(1−𝜙)∙𝐹𝑖(𝑡−1)−1    𝑖f 𝑥(𝑡)−𝐸𝑖(𝑡−1)<0
                                     (19) 
where 𝑥(𝑡) is the payoff received on trial t, and 𝐸𝑖(𝑡 − 1) is the expected value of option 
i on last trial. The frequency value increases by 1 following a positive change or 
decreases by 1 following a negative change. Other aspects of the EFP model used for the 
dynamic decision-making tasks were kept the same. 
A reinforcement learning (RL) model and an eligibility trace (ET) model are 
often utilized to model choices in dynamic decision making tasks (Gureckis & Love, 
2009; Worthy et al., 2012). The RL model was the same as the one for the minimal 
information paradigm. The eligibility trace (ET) model is an extension of the RL model. 
The ET model assumes that an eligibility trace associated with each option encodes how 
often this option has been selected in the past. When expected values are updated, these 
eligibility traces allow for “credit” being assigned to not only the most recent chosen 
option but also to other options according to the respective choice history. In the 
dynamic decision-making task, if the decreasing option is selected on the current trial 
but was not chosen frequently in the past, and the increasing option was chosen quite 
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often in the past, the ET model reinforces selecting the increasing option more than 
choosing the decreasing option following this selection. Formally, the ET model 
assumes that each time an option, i, is chosen the eligibility trace for that option, 𝜀𝑡(𝑖), is 
incremented according to: 
𝜀𝑡(𝑖) = 𝜀𝑡−1(𝑖) + 1        (20) 
The expected value updating rule extends the basic RL model to include the 
additional eligibility trace term: 
𝐸𝑡(𝑗) =  𝐸𝑡(𝑗) + 𝜙 ∙ [𝐸(𝑡) − 𝐸𝑖(𝑡 − 1)] ∙ 𝜀𝑡(𝑗)   (21) 
here 𝜙 is a learning rate parameter as defined in (2). Instead of only updating expected 
value for the chosen option as in the basic RL model, the ET model updates expected 
values for all options, j.   
On each trial, the eligibility trace, 𝜀𝑡(𝑗), for every option, j, decays based on a 
decay parameter, 𝜁, 0 ≤ 𝜁 ≤ 1: 
𝜀𝑡(𝑗) = 𝜀𝑡−1(𝑗) ∙ 𝜁    (22) 
Higher decay parameter (𝜁) values indicate less decay of memory traces for recent 
actions and more credit assignment to options that have been frequently selected in the 
recent past.   
2.4.3 Method 1: Model Fits 
The EFP model was compared against the ET, RL, and Baseline model. 
Following the procedure laid out in the previous sections, these models were compared 
in terms of the average BIC values. Table 6 displays the average BIC value for each 
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model. For both tasks, the EFP model exhibited a much smaller average BIC value than 
other models, suggesting a better fit the EFP model to choices in both tasks. 
 
Table 6 Average and BIC value for each model for the Dynamic Decision-Making 
tasks 
  
 
EFP 
 
ET 
 
RL 
 
Baseline 
Dec Optimal 237.95(69.18) 278.13(72.63) 292.89(68.22) 295.43(58.06) 
Equal 232.97(78.73) 277.73(85.25) 277.43(86.83) 283.47(78.87) 
Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. Values in boldface are the minimum BIC 
values among these models. 
 
 
2.4.4 Method 2: Simulations 
Following the procedure from the previous sections, choices were simulated with 
the EFP, ET, and RL model. The proportion of times that participants and each model 
selected the increasing option within each 25-trial block was computed. The results are 
displayed in Figure 3. Clearly, simulated choices from the EFP model best mimicked 
observed choices. Nevertheless, all models failed to capture the initial trend of 
participants’ choices. All models over-predicted the tendency to select the increasing 
option at the first and/or second block. The dynamic decision-making task is a 
complicated task. There might be mechanisms that this set of computational models did 
not capture. The goal of the EFP model is not to account for participants’ decision-
making processes completely but to investigate whether it can provide improved 
explanation over models that do not incorporate the frequency information. The EFP 
model obviously produced a choice pattern much closer to participants’ choice pattern 
compared to the ET and RL model. The two latter models under-predicted the tendency 
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to select the increasing option. The increasing option consistently provided frequent 
improvements in payoffs. Participants might keep track of the frequency of the payoff 
improvement due to people’s sensitivity to frequency information. The EFP model 
accounted for this frequency heuristic, thus resulting in a better fit to participants’ 
choices. 
2.4.5 Method 3: Generalization Criterion Method 
Like previous sections, the best-fitting parameters from the first task, either the 
decreasing optional or equal task, were utilized to simulate choices in the second task, 
either the equal or decreasing optimal task, respectively. A difference score between 
observed and predicted probabilities of selecting the increasing option was computed for 
each model. Table 7 displays the scores for all models and both tasks. The EFP model 
outperformed the other two models. Also, it is worth noting the RL model performed 
better than the ET model in terms of the generalization criterion. Taken together, the 
enhanced complexity of the EFP model relative to the RL model was justified by the 
generalization criterion test, while the increased complexity of the ET model seemed to 
lead to overfitting. 
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Figure 3 Observed and simulated choices from the increasing option. Simulations 
were run with each set of best-fitting parameter values. The error bars for human 
choice behavior indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Table 7 Generalization criterion method results for the Dynamic Decision-Making 
tasks 
Target task Model Estimated Task 
  
Dec Optimal Equal 
Equal 
EFP 68.30  
ET 139.39  
RL 113.87  
Dec Optimal 
EFP  97.32 
ET  269.83 
RL  211.83 
Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. Values in boldface are the minimum 
BIC values among these models. 
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2.5 Discussion 
Recently, more and more research focuses on decisions from experience (e.g., 
Hertwig, 2012; Hertwig, et al., 2004; Hills & Hertwig, 2010). In experience-based 
decision-making, frequency of gains and/or losses is often salient. Moreover, previous 
research demonstrates that people are highly sensitive to frequency information (e.g., 
Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Hasher & Zacks, 1979). Thus, frequency of gains versus losses 
might play an important role in experience-based decision-making. This study took a 
computational modeling approach to address this issue. A wide range of computational 
models have been established such as the PVL models (Ahn et al., 2008), the VPP model 
(Worthy et al., 2013) and the ET model (Gureckis & Love, 2009). These models mainly 
account for expected value, and some models also take into account perseveration (e.g., 
VPP). Extending from these models, EFP models which incorporated the frequency 
heuristic were developed for three major experience-based decision-making paradigms, 
and were compared to previous models thoroughly through three model comparison 
approaches.  
Although they were not always superior to other models, the EFP models 
consistently performed well across different decision-making contexts and on different 
model performance indexes. The EFP models are more complex than some models but 
the generalization criterion results justified the slightly improved complexity, while 
some other complex models sometimes failed in the generalization criterion test. The 
consistently good performance of the EFP model supports the idea that people are highly 
sensitive to frequency information. More importantly, it indicates a critical role of gain-
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loss frequency and the pervasiveness of the frequency heuristic in experience-based 
decision-making.  
In addition, Study 1 contributes to the following studies by providing the EFP 
model to further understanding of choice data. Besides behavioral data analysis, 
applying the model to the data allows me to decompose the contributions of gain-loss 
frequency and expected value to choice behavior, thus providing more direct insight into 
the underlying psychological mechanisms of decision-making process. 
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3. STUDY 2 
Study 2 was intended to assess the role of WM in the use of the frequency 
heuristic. WM load was manipulated by a dual-task paradigm. One group of participants 
performed the SGT only, while the other group performed the SGT and a WM-
demanding task concurrently. Previous research on the relation between WM and the 
performance in the IGT yielded mixed results (e.g., Dretsch & Tipples, 2008; Li et al., 
2010; Turnbull, Evans, Bunce, Carzolio, & O’Connor, 2005). In terms of frequency 
processing, prior work found that age, verbal ability, or intention did not impact 
frequency judgment accuracy (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Zacks, Hasher, & Sanft, 
1982), suggesting that frequency processing requires few WM resources, thus implying 
the absence of effects of WM load on the use of frequency heuristic. However, previous 
research where cognitive load was manipulated provided evidence that WM load impairs 
frequency processing (Mutter & Goedert, 1997; Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1986; but 
see Zacks et al., 1982). Moreover, in prior studies, single task participants tended to use 
a simple heuristic, win-stay-lose-shift, while participants under WM load tended to make 
choices based implicitly tracked expected values (Otto et al., 2011; Worthy et al., 2012). 
I thus predicted that WM load would reduce the use of frequency heuristic in the 
decision-making task. Since reliance on the gain-loss frequency in the SGT is 
disadvantageous, it was also predicted that WM load would enhance the SGT 
performance.  
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3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
Eighty-three participants (49 females) recruited from an introductory psychology 
course at Texas A&M University participated in the experiment for course credit. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants, and the experiment was approved 
for ethics procedures using human participants. Participants were randomly assigned to 
either the single task (ST; n = 42) or dual task (DT; n = 41) condition. My original goal 
was to collect 40 participants in each condition, but these numbers were slightly 
exceeded due to an oversight by the experimenters.  
3.1.2 Materials and Procedures 
Participants performed the experiment on PCs using Psychtoolbox for Matlab 
(version 2.5). Participants in the ST condition only performed the SGT (Chiu et al., 
2008). They were informed that the game involved a series of selections from four decks 
of cards and each selection would always result in either gains or losses. Participants 
started off with 2,000 points and were instructed to try to finish with a total of at least 
2,500 points. On each of 100 trials, four decks of cards appeared on the screen and 
participants were prompted to select one deck. Upon each selection the computer screen 
displayed the reward or penalty beneath the card decks. The cumulative total score was 
displayed on the right side of the screen. The task was self-paced, and participants were 
unaware of how many card draws they would receive. The schedule of gains and losses 
was identical to those used Chiu et al., 2008 (see Table 1).  
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In the DT conditions, in addition to the SGT participants performed a numerical 
Stroop task concurrently. The memory task required participants to remember which of 
two numbers was physically larger and which was larger in numerical value while 
performing the SGT. On each trial the four decks of cards were presented in the center of 
the screen. At the beginning of each trial, two numbers for the concurrent memory task 
were presented on each side of the screen, one number on each side, for 300 ms. 
Participants were then allowed to make a selection from among four decks of cards, 
followed by feedback as mentioned above. A new screen then appeared that queried 
participants with either VALUE or SIZE, and they selected either Left or Right to indicate 
which side had the number largest in either numerical value or physical size. Upon 
making a selection, they were told whether they were correct or not, and then the next 
trial began.  
Following previous studies that have used the same concurrent task 
manipulation, participants were told that they should focus on achieving good 
performance on the numerical Stroop task and “use what you have left over” for the 
decision-making task (Waldron & Ashby, 2001; Worthy et al., 2012; Zeithamova & 
Maddox, 2006). To allow them to become familiar with the procedure, participants were 
given 10 practice trials. The practice trials were the same as the formal ones except that 
each selection on the SGT resulted in zero points regardless of which deck they selected. 
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3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Behavioral Results  
I first examined performance in the SGT which was computed as the proportion 
of advantageous minus disadvantageous deck selections. One hundred card selections 
were divided into five blocks of 20 trials. Figure 4 displays performance over five 20-
trial blocks in each condition. A mixed ANOVA with WM load (ST versus DT) as a 
between-subjects factor and Block (five 20-trial blocks) as a within-subject factor 
revealed a significant main effect of WM load, F(1, 81) = 6.50, p = .01, partial η2 = .07, 
and for block, F(4, 324) = 14.76, p = .00, partial η2 = .15. The WM load X Block 
interaction was also significant, F(4, 324) = 2.95, p = .02, partial η2 = .04. To examine 
this interaction, I looked at the simple effect of WM load within each block using t-tests. 
As can be seen in Figure 4, although participants in both the ST and DT conditions 
appeared to learn to perform better across the task, DT participants performed better 
compared to ST participants in the first three blocks (ps < .01), but ST participants 
reached a similar performance level as DT participants in the last two blocks (ps > .72). 
This result suggests that WM load affected decision-making early in the SGT such that 
WM load improved performance. 
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Figure 4 Performance in the Soochow Gambling Task (SGT) by 20-trial blocks for 
each WM condition (ST versus DT) in Study 2. Error bars represent ±1 SE. 
 
 
I next conducted a similar mixed ANOVA for each deck. Figure 5 displays the 
proportion of trials that each deck was selected over five 20-trial blocks in each WM 
condition. For Deck A there was a main effect of block, F(4, 324) = 9.87, p = .00, partial 
η2 = .11, suggesting that all participants learned to select Deck A less often over the task. 
No other significant results were observed (ps > .11).  
The analysis for Deck B showed that ST participants (M = .31, SD = .06) selected 
disadvantageous Deck B more often than DT participants (M = .23, SD = .08), F(1, 81) = 
20.77, p < .001, partial η2 = .20. There was also a significant main effect of block, F(4, 
324) = 3.25, p = .01, partial η2 = .04, and a significant WM load X Block interaction, 
F(4, 324) = 2.53, p = .04, partial η2 = .03. To examine this interaction, I looked at the 
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simple effect of WM load within each block using an independent samples t-test. ST 
participants chose Deck B more often in the first three blocks (ps < .01) than did DT 
participants, but they did not significantly differ in the last two blocks (ps > .14). 
For Deck C, ST participants (M = .17, SD = .09) chose this advantageous Deck C 
less often than did DT participants (M = .23, SD = .09), F(1, 81) = 7.71, p = .01, partial 
η2 = .09. It also revealed a significant main effect of block, F(4, 324) = 9.81, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .11, suggesting that participants in both conditions learned to select Deck C 
more often as the task progressed. The interaction was not significant (p = .10).  
For Deck D, there was a main effect of block, F(4, 324) = 3.95, p = .00, partial η2 
= .05, indicating that participants in both conditions learned to select Deck D more often. 
No other significant results were observed (ps > .22).  
To summarize, the data from Study 2 indicated that participants under WM load 
performed better overall than ST participants, and that this advantage was due to better 
performance early on in the task. This pattern of behavior may have been due to 
participants who performed the task under the no-load condition being initially biased 
towards the disadvantageous decks because of their enhanced attention to the high 
frequency of gains and low frequency of losses provided by these decks.  As the task 
progressed, ST participants learned to select the decks based on their expected values 
rather than their gain-loss frequencies. 
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Figure 5 Proportion that each deck was selected in the Soochow Gambling Task 
(SGT) by 20-trial blocks under each WM condition (ST versus DT) in Study 2. 
Error bars represent ±1 SE. 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Modeling Results 
Model Selection  
Five models were fit to the data, including the EFP model that was developed in 
Study 1, the two PVL models, the VPP model, and the baseline model (see Study 1 for 
detailed descriptions of these models). I fit each participant’s data in each condition 
individually by maximizing the log-likelihood for each model’s prediction on each trial. 
BIC was used to examine the relative fit of the models. Average BIC values for each 
model under each condition are listed in Table 8. In both WM conditions, the EFP model 
had the smallest average BIC values. Thus, these data suggest that the EFP model 
provides a better fit than other models to the choice behavior in the SGT. 
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Table 8 Average BIC values for each model as a function of the WM condition in 
Study 2 
Model ST DT 
EFP 246.02(33.09) 264.63(26.35) 
VPP 249.11(33.77) 271.89(26.97) 
PVL-Delta 264.12(21.38) 269.23(25.82) 
PVL-Decay 250.23(25.66) 267.49(24.88) 
Baseline 266.34(20.24) 265.19(23.90) 
Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. Values in boldface are the minimum BIC 
values among these models. 
 
 
 
Comparison of Best-Fitting Parameters 
I next compared the parameter estimates of the EFP model between the ST and 
DT conditions to examine the effects of WM load on specific psychological processes 
related to decision-making. Table 9 lists the median best fitting parameter values of the 
EFP model under each WM condition. Nonparametric Mann-Whitney U tests were used 
because the best-fitting parameters were not normally distributed. ST participants 
exhibited lower values for the weight parameter than did DT participants, U = 637, p = 
.04. This suggests that participants with compromised cognitive resources were less 
likely to utilize the frequency heuristic in the SGT. Moreover, data from ST participants 
were best fit by higher learning rate parameter values than data from DT participants, U 
= 626, p = .03. This result suggests that ST participants were more attentive to recent 
outcomes, which might allow participants with intact WM resources to more actively 
update expectancies compared to participants under WM load. ST participants also 
exhibited higher perseveration values than did DT participants, U = 435, p < .001, 
suggesting that ST participants were more likely to perseverate with the choice 
previously chosen. I also found that ST participants showed lower consistency parameter 
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values than did DT participants, U = 629, p = .04, indicative of enhanced exploration 
among ST participants. Last, the difference in loss aversion parameter estimates was not 
significant, U = 730, p = .22. 
 
 
Table 9 Median parameter estimates from maximum likelihood fits as a function of 
the WM condition in Study 2  
Parameters ST DT 
Learning 0.29 0.09 
Loss Aversion 0.42 0.04 
Perseveration 0.34 −0.13 
Weight 0.39 0.95 
Consistency 0.77 0.90 
 
 
 
3.3 Discussion 
The behavioral and computational modeling results provide consistent evidence 
that WM plays a critical role in utilizing the frequency heuristic in experience-based 
decision-making. Participants under WM load performed better overall than participants 
with intact WM resources, and that this advantage was due to better performance early 
on in the task. Given that a preference to the high-gain-frequency and low-loss-
frequency decks leads to inferior performance in the SGT, this pattern of behavior may 
be because participants who performed the task under the no-load condition were 
initially biased towards the disadvantageous decks due to their enhanced attention to the 
high frequency of gains and low frequency of losses provided by these decks, while 
participants under WM load did not form such a bias because attenuated attention did 
not allow them to utilize the frequency heuristic.  As the task progressed, ST participants 
learned to select the decks based on their expected values rather than their gain-loss 
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frequencies. Computational modeling results provided further support to these 
implications. Participants under WM load exhibited greater weight to RL expected value 
versus gain-loss frequency than those in the no-load condition, providing direct evidence 
that WM load reduces attention to gain-loss frequency and thus prevents participants 
with compromised WM resources forming a bias towards the bad decks based on the 
frequency information. DT task participants might track expected values implicitly as 
suggested in Otto et al. (2011) and Worthy et al. (2012). Moreover, participants with 
intact WM resources exhibited higher learning rate than those under WM load, 
suggesting that ST participants were more attentive to recent outcomes. This could allow 
them to more actively update expected values and thus reach a similar level of 
performance as participants under WM load at later stage of the task. 
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4. STUDY 3 
The results from Study 2 suggest that WM contributes to utilizing frequency 
information in decision-making. What is still unclear is whether WM load reduces the 
accuracy of gain-loss frequency estimation or undermines other components of the 
process of using frequency information. Some work in the frequency processing 
literature suggests that frequency judgment requires no or few WM resources (Hasher & 
Zacks, 1984; Zacks et al., 1982). It is thus likely that WM load does not impair 
frequency estimation but other components such as integrating frequency information 
and expected value. Study 3 served multiple purposes. The first one was to investigate 
whether WM load would diminish frequency judgment accuracy in a decision-making 
task, thus causing a problem to utilize the frequency information. Like in Study 2, one 
group of participants only performed the SGT and the other group did it and a numerical 
Stroop task concurrently. To examine frequency judgment, at the end of experiment all 
participants were asked to estimate the frequency of gains and losses for each deck. If 
WM load does not reduce the accuracy of estimating the gain-loss frequency, it would 
suggest that WM contributes to other components in the process of using frequency 
information in decision-making. Otherwise, it would suggest that at least one role of 
WM is to help reach an accurate judgment of gain-loss frequency, although WM might 
also contribute to other processes.  
Moreover, Study 3 sought to replicate the results from Study 2. In Study 3, 
participants’ working memory capacity (WMC) was also measured. One the one hand, it 
served as a covariate when the WM load effect was analyzed. On the other, I examined 
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the association between frequency judgment accuracy and WMC to seek convergent 
evidence for the role of WM in frequency processing.  
Study 3 also address the issue of whether frequency judgment is based on an 
automatic frequency-processing process. Besides examining it in the decision-making 
task, I also investigated the effect of WM load on frequency judgment accuracy in a 
typical frequency processing task, a word frequency judgment task, which allows for 
directly comparing the current results to previous work on frequency processing. WM 
load manipulation for the word frequency judgment task was also done with asking 
participants to perform a numerical Stroop task concurrently. Prior work that directly 
manipulated WM load exhibited that enhanced WM load diminished the accuracy of 
estimating the frequency of words in a word list or pictures in a series of pictures (e.g., 
Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1986; Sanders et al., 1987). Hence, I hypothesized that WM 
load would reduce frequency judgment accuracy in both the word frequency judgment 
task and the SGT.  
The last purpose of Study 3 was to compare the effects of WM load on frequency 
judgment in the typical frequency processing task and the decision-making task. 
Decision-making is presumably a more complicated process than word frequency 
judgment. Thus, even if WM load does not reduce the judgment accuracy in the word 
frequency judgment task, it might diminish the accuracy in the decision-making task. 
Also, it is possible that frequency judgment is generally WM-dependent, and thus WM 
load would exhibit similar levels of effects on the judgment accuracy in the word 
frequency judgment task and decision-making task. 
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4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants    
One hundred and eighty participants (seventy-three females) recruited from an 
introductory psychology course at Texas A&M University participated in the experiment 
for course credit. Informed consent was obtained from all participants, and the 
experiment was approved for ethics procedures using human participants. Forty-five 
participants were randomly assigned to each of the four conditions where they 
performed the following tasks: the word frequency judgment task (word ST condition), 
the word frequency judgment and numerical Stroop task (word DT condition), the SGT 
(decision-making ST condition), the SGT and numerical Stroop task (decision-making 
DT condition). Four participants were excluded due to computer failure: 2 from the 
decision-making ST condition, 1 from the decision-making DT condition, and 1 from the 
word ST condition.  
4.1.2 Materials and Procedures 
All experiment tasks were implemented on PCs using Psychtoolbox for Matlab 
(version 2.5) except the frequency judgment part in the SGT and the word frequency 
judgment task. Participants completed the judgment part with pen and paper. 
SGT 
For the two groups of participants who performed the SGT, the materials and 
procedures are similar to those in Study 2. There was one difference. After finishing the 
decision-making task, participants in both the ST and DT conditions were asked to make 
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frequency judgments on gains and losses for each deck. Specifically, the questions they 
were asked are: 
Suppose you were to select 100 cards from Deck A 
In how many of the 100 trials would you expect to get a loss? 
In how many of the 100 trials would you expect to get a gain? 
Word Frequency Judgment Task 
The pool of words used to construct the stimulus list consisted of 25 English 
nouns with a length of 5 to 7 letters and a frequency of 35 to 50 occurrences per 50,000 
according to the Francis and Kucera’s (1982) analysis of word usage frequency. Five of 
these words appeared twice in the list, another five words appeared three times, and so 
on, with the last five appearing six times. Together, there are 100 target stimuli (100 = 
5*2 + 5*3 + 5*4 + 5*5 + 5*6; matching the 100 cards in the decision-making task). To 
absorb primacy and recency effects, 5 additional words were added to the beginning of 
the list and 5 to the end. In addition, 4 words were added to the beginning of the list for 
practice. Altogether, there were 114 words in the stimulus list for of this study. These 
words were presented at a rate of one word per 4s.  
In the study phase of the task, ST participants only studied the words. On each 
trial, one word was presented on the computer screen for 4s. Participants were told to 
pay close attention to each word to prepare for an upcoming frequency judgment test. 
DT participants were told that they would perform two tasks during the presentation of 
the words. One task was to study the words and the other was to answer questions about 
numbers presented on each trial. The procedure was the same to that used in the 
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decision-making DT condition except that the SGT was replaced with the word study 
task. At the beginning of each trial, two numbers were presented for 300 ms, then a word 
was presented for 4s, and finally participants responded to questions about the physical 
size or numerical value of the numbers. Following Study 2, participants were instructed 
that they should focus on achieving good performance on the number memory task and 
“use what you have left over” for the word study task. 
After studying the words under either a ST or DT condition, participants were 
asked to judge the frequency of occurrences of a list of 50 words. This list consisted of 
the 25 target words having appeared in the study phase and another 25 new words which 
have a similar word length and frequency in English usage. The 50 words were 
randomly mixed. Participants were given a sheet with these words and asked to write 
down a number for each word which represents the frequency of appearance of each 
word in the study phase. They were informed that some of these words were not 
appeared in the study phase. This design is modified based on Naveh-Benjamin and 
Jonides (1986) and Mutter and Goedert (1997). 
WMC 
At the conclusion of the experiment, participants from all conditions were asked 
to complete a task to measure their working memory capacity (WMC). The operation 
span task (OSPAN; Turner & Engle, 1989) was administered to measure WMC. In this 
task, participants were required to solve a series of math operations and remember 
unrelated words. In particular, they were first asked to solve a math problem (e.g., (8/2) 
+ 2 = 5? respond yes or no) and then remember a word (e.g., bear). They were then to 
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solve another math problem, followed by another word. After a particular number (e.g., 
3) of pairs of math-word problems (i.e., a set of pairings), they were asked recall the 
words in order presented in that set. The size of the set of math-word pairings ranged 
from 2 to 5 items. The OSPAN score was calculated by summing the number of words 
recalled for all correctly recalled sets. 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Decision-Making Behavioral Results 
The analysis was like that in Study 2 except that WMC was included in the 
analysis. First, the overall performance was examined. Figure 6 displays performance 
over five 20-trial blocks in each WM load condition. I conducted an ANCOVA with 
WM load (ST versus DT) as a between-subjects factor, Block (five 20-trial blocks) as a 
within-subject factor, and WMC as a covariate. It revealed a significant main effect of 
WM load, F(1,84) = 5.33, p = .02,  partial η2 = .06. ST participants (M = -.38, SD = .27) 
performed worse than DT participants (M = -.25, SD = .25). No other main effects or 
interactions were significant, ps > .25. These results suggest that WM load improved 
overall performance in the SGT, consistent with the finding from Study 2.  
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Figure 6 Performance in the Soochow Gambling Task (SGT) by 20-trial blocks for 
each WM condition (ST versus DT) in Study 3. Error bars represent ±1 SE. 
 
 
 
I next conducted a similar ANOVA for each deck. Figure 7 displays the 
proportion of trials that each deck was selected over five 20-trial blocks in each WM 
condition. The analysis for Deck A did not reveal any significant effects, ps > .29. 
For Deck B there was a main effect of WM load, F(1, 84) = 8.51, p < .01, partial 
η2 = .09. ST participants (M = .29, SD = .14) selected disadvantageous Deck B more 
often than DT participants (M = .23, SD = .12). There were no other significant main 
effects or interactions, ps > .55. 
The analysis for Deck C revealed a significant WM load X Block interaction, 
F(4, 336) = 3.28, p = .01, partial η2 = .04. To examine this interaction, I looked at the 
simple effect of WM load within each block using an independent samples t-test. ST 
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participants chose Deck C less often in the first block (p = .01) than did DT participants, 
but they did not significantly differ in the following blocks (ps > .25). No other 
significant results were observed (ps > .34). 
For Deck D, ST participants (M = .12, SD = .09) chose this advantageous deck 
less often than did DT participants (M = .19, SD = .17), F(1, 84) = 6.43, p = .01, partial 
η2 = .07. It also revealed a significant main effect of block, F(4, 336) = 4.09, p < .01, 
partial η2 = .05. There were no other significant effects, ps > .13. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Proportion that each deck was selected in the Soochow Gambling Task 
(SGT) by 20-trial blocks under each WM condition (ST versus DT) in Study 3. 
Error bars represent ±1 SE. 
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4.2.2 Decision-Making Modeling Results 
Model Selection  
Five models were fit to the data, including the EFP model, the two PVL models, 
the VPP model, and the baseline model by the same maximum likelihood method as 
before. Average BIC values for each model under each condition are listed in Table 10. 
In both WM conditions, the EFP model had the smallest average BIC values. Thus, these 
data suggest that the EFP model provides a better fit than other models to the choice 
behavior in the SGT. Note that the VPP model also performed well for the data from ST 
participants.  
 
 
Table 10 Average BIC values for each model as a function of the WM condition in 
Study 3 
Model ST DT 
EFP 241.39(39.78) 256.54(32.61) 
VPP 242.14(38.09) 263.56(31.54) 
PVL-Delta 256.77(29.07) 264.79(29.26) 
PVL-Decay 252.79(30.98) 267.34(28.19) 
Baseline 259.77(23.53) 263.33(23.60) 
Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. Values in boldface are the minimum BIC 
values among these models. 
 
 
 
Comparison of Best-Fitting Parameters 
The parameter estimates of the EFP model between the ST and DT conditions 
were compared to examine the effects of WM load on specific psychological processes 
related to decision-making. Table 11 lists the median best-fitting parameter values of the 
EFP model under each WM condition. Nonparametric Mann-Whitney U tests were used 
because the best-fitting parameters were not normally distributed. ST participants 
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exhibited lower values for the weight parameter than did DT participants, U = 881, p = 
.04. This suggests that participants with compromised cognitive resources were less 
likely to utilize the frequency heuristic in the SGT, consistent with the behavioral results 
from this study and the findings from Study 2. No other significant differences were 
found between the WM load conditions, p’s >.15.  
 
 
Table 11 Median parameter estimates from maximum likelihood fits as a function 
of the WM condition in Study 3 
Parameters ST DT 
Learning 0.14 0.11 
Loss Aversion 0.22 0.09 
Perseveration 0.00 −0.07 
Weight 0.68 0.97 
Consistency 0.81 0.85 
 
 
4.2.3 Gain-Loss Frequency Judgment Results  
To measure frequency judgment accuracy, the slope of the linear regression 
relating frequency judgments5 to actual frequencies was calculated for each participant. 
Since the slope of 1 indicates a prediction being absolutely accurate, the absolute value 
of the difference between each calculated slope and 1 was computed as a measure of 
each participant’s judgment accuracy. A smaller number indicates a more accurate 
judgment. To avoid misunderstanding, I referred to this measure as a frequency 
judgment score. An ANCOVA was conducted with WM load as a between-subjects 
                                                 
5 The gain frequency judgments were employed to calculate the accuracy score. Using the loss frequency 
judgments would yield the same results since the gain and loss frequency judgments were perfectly 
correlated (All participants knew Gain Frequency = 100 – Loss Frequency).  
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factor and WMC as a covariate. It revealed a significant main effect of WM load, F(1, 
78) = 7.58, p < .01, partial η2 = .09. ST participants (M = .40, SD = .34) made more 
accurate judgments than DT participants (M = .59, SD = .40). There was also a 
significant effect of WMC, F(1, 78) = 6.79, p = .01, partial η2 = .08. Figure 8 illustrates 
the relationship between WMC and the frequency judgment score. Participants with 
higher WMC tended to make more accurate frequency judgments than participant with 
lower WMC. These results suggest that WM contributes to the process of frequency 
judgment in the decision-making task.  
 
 
 
Figure 8 Association between working memory capacity and frequency judgment 
scores in the SGT within each WM load condition (ST versus DT). 
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4.2.4 Word Frequency Judgment Results 
The same procedure was used to calculate the frequency judgment scores for the 
word frequency judgments. An ANCOVA was conducted on the scores with WM load 
as a between-subjects factor and WMC as a covariate. It revealed a significant main 
effect of WM load, F(1, 86) = 5.04, p = .03, partial η2 = .06. ST participants (M = .41, 
SD = .24) made more accurate frequency judgments about the frequency of occurrences 
of words than did DT participants (M = .52, SD = .23). There was also a marginally 
significant effect of WMC, F(1, 86) = 3.87, p = .05, partial η2 = .04. Figure 9 illustrates 
the relationship between WMC and the frequency judgment score. Participants with 
higher WMC tended to make more accurate frequency judgments than participant with 
lower WMC. These results from the word frequency judgment task are in line with the 
results from the SGT and confirmed the role of WM in frequency judgment.  
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Figure 9 Association between working memory capacity and frequency judgment 
scores in the word frequency judgment task within each WM load condition (ST 
versus DT). 
 
 
 
4.2.5 Comparison of WM Effects between the SGT and the Word Task 
Considering that the frequency of gains and losses and the frequency of words 
were on different scales, the accuracy measures might not be comparable directly. Thus, 
these scores were standardized with the standard deviation for each score distribution 
before comparison. An ANCOVA was then conducted with Task (SGT versus Word 
Task) and WM load as between-subjects factors, and WMC as a covariate. It uncovered 
significant main effects of WM load and WMC, F(1, 165) = 12.55, p = .001, partial η2 = 
.07, and F(1, 165) = 10.75, p = .001, partial η2 = .06, respectively. These results are 
consistent with the results from separate analyses given above. No main effect of Task or 
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interactions were found, ps > .26. Thus, it seems that WM had similar effects on 
frequency judgment in the word frequency judgment task and the decision-making task.  
4.3 Discussion 
Study 3 replicated the main finding of Study 2: WM is critical in the use of the 
frequency heuristic in experience-based decision-making. Participants under WM load 
performed better overall and exhibited greater weight to RL expected value versus gain-
loss frequency than participants with intact WM resources, both providing evidence that 
WM load reduces attention to gain-loss frequency. Nevertheless, while in Study 2 
participants under the no-load condition were able to reach a similar level of 
performance as those under WM load at a later stage of the task, in Study 3 participants 
with intact WM resources consistently performed more poorly over the task than did 
those whose WM was taxed. To facilitate comparison, Figure 10 displays performance 
over five 20-trial blocks in each WM load condition in Studies 2 and 3. While DT 
participants in the two studies had different performance in Blocks 2 and 4, they 
exhibited similar trends of performance over the task and had similar performance at the 
last block. Participants under the no-load condition in the two studies also showed 
similar trends of performance across blocks, but participants in Study 3 did worse than 
those in Study 2 in the last two blocks, especially in Block 5. In Study 2, I proposed that 
although ST participants were biased to rely on the frequency heuristic early in the task, 
they were able to learn to select the decks based expected values at the later stage. ST 
participants in Study 3 did not appear to be able to switch their strategies, resulting in 
consistently poorer performance. This might be due to a semester-related timing effect 
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(Nicholls, Loveless, Thomas, Loetscher, & Churches, 2015). Study 2 was conducted 
early in semester, while Study 3 was done towards the end of a semester. Nicholls and 
colleagues (2015) found that participants who engaged late in semester showed 
decreased intrinsic motivation than those who did early. Hence, Study 3 participants 
might be less likely to switch to a strategy that relies on expected value instead of 
frequency information because of being less intrinsically motivated. Diminished 
motivation could make participants under the no-load condition less likely to detect an 
expected-value-based strategy and/or less willing to switch from a frequency-biased 
strategy, which may be their default strategy. In contrast, these effects would not affect 
DT participants much because they were not initially biased to the frequency heuristic.  
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Figure 10 Performance in the Soochow Gambling Task (SGT) by 20-trial blocks for 
each WM condition (ST versus DT) in Study 2 and Study 3. Error bars represent 
±1 SE. 
 
 
 
Both Studies 2 and 3 suggest that WM contributes to utilizing frequency 
information in decision-making. One major goal of Study 3 was to delineate a more 
precise role of WM. Does WM load reduce the accuracy of gain-loss frequency 
judgments or undermine other components in the process of using frequency 
information? Study 3 found that WM load reduced the accuracy of gain-loss frequency 
judgments and higher WMC was associated with more accurate judgments, suggesting 
that one role of WM in the use of frequency heuristic is to help decision makers to make 
more accurate frequency judgments which could in turn form the basis of the frequency 
heuristic. Most WM models maintain that the main functions of WM are to direct and 
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control attention (Baddeley, 2012). It is likely that decision makers with greater WM 
resources6 are able to direct more attention to frequency processing and protect related 
psychological operations from unrelated stimuli, resulting in more accurate frequency 
judgment. Also, it is worth noting that although it confirmed WM’s contribution to 
frequency judgment, this work did not rule out the possibility that WM might also 
contribute to other processes of using the frequency heuristic. 
Some prior work found that frequency judgment accuracy was invariant with 
respect to age, verbal ability, and intention (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Zacks et al., 
1982). Some theorists proposed an influential notion that frequency processing is 
effortless and automatic (Hasher & Zacks, 1984; see also Zacks & Hasher, 2002). 
Several following studies in which WM load was manipulated found that diminished 
WM resources led to poor frequency judgment, indicative of an important role of WM in 
frequency judgment. The current work added evidence to this idea. Study 3 found that 
WM load reduced the accuracy of frequency judgment in a typical frequency processing 
task, the word frequency judgment task, and the decision-making task. Further, this 
study revealed a link between higher WMC and more accurate frequency judgment in 
both the word frequency judgment task and the decision-making task. The convergent 
evidence lends strong support to the idea that the processes underlying frequency 
judgments depends on WM.  
                                                 
6 Following Schmeichel’s resource account on executive control (2003), this work assumes that people 
with higher working memory capacity have more working memory resources available. 
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The last purpose of Study 3 was to test whether WM load would exhibit a 
stronger effect on frequency judgment in the decision-making task than in the word 
frequency judgment task. Because I reasoned that decision-making is presumably a more 
complicated process than word frequency judgment (e.g., decision-making requires 
integrating the frequency value and expected value for each option). However, the 
absence of an interaction between Task and WM load did not provide support to the 
hypothesis. The increased WM demand due to additional operations required by the 
decision-making task compared to the word frequency judgment task might be minimal 
when it is compared to WM taxed by a concurrent numerical Stroop task.   
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5. STUDY 4 
Study 4 was aimed to evaluate aging effects on utilizing the frequency heuristic. 
The SGT was still used to examine this issue. Three group of adults, younger, middle-
aged, and older adults, performed the SGT. Previous research suggests people tend to 
use heuristics more with advancing age (e.g., Carpenter & Yoon, 2011; Chen & Sun, 
2003; Kim et al., 2005). Hence, older adults might also use the frequency heuristic more 
in the SGT. However, Studies 2 and 3 provide convergent evidence that using the 
frequency heuristic requires WM. Considering age-related decline in cognitive 
functioning, older adults’ use of the frequency heuristic appears to depend on whether 
declined cognitive ability in older age would constrain the utilization of the frequency 
heuristic. Previous frequency processing research found that the accuracy of frequency 
judgment did not change with age (Attig & Hasher, 1980), implying that reserved WM 
capacity in older adults might suffice for frequency processing. I thus predicted that the 
use of frequency heuristic would enhance with age.  
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participants 
Nighty-nine participants (30 females) recruited from the greater College Station, 
Texas, community and were paid $8 per hour for participation. 30 healthy younger 
adults (YA; mean age 24.83 years, range 18 – 38), 33 middle-aged adults (MA; mean 
age 49.24 years, range 40 – 59), and 32 older adults (OA; mean age 69.64 years, range 
60 – 92) were included in the analysis. 4 additional participants were excluded due to 
computer failure. Written informed consent was obtained from all subjects according to 
  76 
procedures approved by the Texas A&M University Internal Review Board. To 
determine whether older adults were functioning within the normal range for their age, 
they were administered a battery of neuropsychological tests measuring attention, verbal 
memory, visual memory, speed, and executive function. No older adults were excluded 
on these criteria.  
5.1.2 Materials and Procedures 
Participants performed the experiment on PCs using Psychtoolbox for Matlab 
(version 2.5). They performed the SGT among other experimental tasks.  
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Behavioral Results 
I first compared overall SGT performance between the three groups of 
participants (YA versus MA versus OA). Figure 11 displays performance over five 20-
trial blocks for each age group. A one-way ANOVA did not reveal a significant effect of 
age on the overall performance, F(2, 92) = .33, p = .72, partial η2 = .01. A similar 
analysis was also conducted on the proportion of selections for each deck. All analyses 
yielded non-significant results (ps > .31). Thus, the behavioral results suggest that choice 
behavior in the SGT does not change with age.  
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Figure 11 Performance in the Soochow Gambling Task (SGT) by 20-trial blocks for 
each age group. Error bars represent ±1 SE. 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Modeling Results 
Decision-making is a complex process and numerous psychological factors 
contribute to this process. Despite the lack of observed differences in the choice 
behavior in the SGT between the three age groups, it is likely that aging might cause 
some change of psychological processes involved in decision-making. I then applied 
computational modeling to understand the psychological processes.  
Model Selection  
The computational modeling analysis procedure is the same as in Studies 2 and 
3. Five models were fit to the data, including the EFP model, the two PVL models, the 
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VPP model, and the baseline model. Average BIC values for each model for each age 
group are listed in Table 12. Across all age groups, the EFP model had the smallest 
average BIC values, suggesting that the EFP model provided a better fit than other 
models to this dataset. 
 
 
Table 12 Average BIC values for each model as a function of the age group in 
Study 4 
Model YA MA OA 
EFP 211.69(44.05) 211.58(43.16) 214.86(48.76) 
VPP 214.64(43.99) 216.63(41.32) 222.25(48.46) 
PVL-Delta 241.33(46.89) 254.33(31.57) 252.99(37.56) 
PVL-Decay 221.72(42.00) 223.35(27.71) 222.57(37.05) 
Baseline 243.60(42.92) 254.37(26.59) 259.77(33.54) 
Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. Values in boldface are the minimum BIC 
values among these models. 
 
 
 
Comparison of Best-Fitting Parameters 
I next compared the parameter estimates of the EFP model between the three age 
groups to investigate the aging effects on specific psychological processes related to 
decision-making, especially the use of frequency heuristic. Table 13 lists the median 
best-fitting parameter values of the EFP model for each age group. Nonparametric 
Mann-Whitney U tests were used. Older adults exhibited lower values for the weight 
parameter than did younger adults, U = 336, p = .04. This suggests that older adults were 
more likely to utilize the frequency heuristic. Similarly, middle-aged adults showed 
lower values for the weight parameter than did younger adults, U = 343, p = .03, 
indicating enhanced use of the frequency heuristic by middle-aged adults compared to 
younger adults. There was no difference in the weight parameter value between older 
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and middle-aged adults, U = 523, p = .95. In addition, data from younger adults were 
best fit by higher consistency parameter values than data from older adults, U = 319, p = 
.02. This result suggests that older adults made choices less consistently than younger 
adults. A similar trend was also observed that middle-aged adults were less consistent on 
choices than younger adults, U = 369, p = .08. No significant aging effects were found 
on the best-fitting parameter values of the learning rate parameter, loss aversion, or 
perseveration. 
 
 
Table 13 Median parameter estimates from maximum likelihood fits as a function 
of the age group in Study 4 
Parameters YA MA OA 
Learning .10 .13 .20 
Loss Aversion .37 .01 .10 
Perseveration .46 .78 1.36 
Weight 1.00 .89 .82 
Consistency 1.05 .79 .57 
 
 
  
5.3 Discussion 
Although a difference in the SGT performance was not observed, the 
computational modeling results revealed age-related changes in the psychological 
processes underlying decision-making. The weight parameter comparison result suggests 
that older and middle-aged adults are more likely to use the frequency heuristic than 
younger adults. Using the frequency heuristic in the SGT is disadvantageous, implying 
that older and middle-aged adults would have performed worse than younger adults. 
However, the modeling results also suggest that people in older age tend to respond 
more randomly. As a result, they did not keep choosing disadvantageous choices as often 
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as greater reliance on the frequency heuristic would imply. Together, increased use of 
the frequency heuristic and decreased consistency in older and middle-aged adults 
resulted in similar performance as younger adults. This study suggests that age-related 
cognitive decline does not limit the use of the frequency heuristic for people in older 
age. Therefore, they more likely utilize this heuristic than younger adults, consistent with 
previous findings that people tend to use heuristics with advancing age (Chen & Sun, 
2003; Kim et al., 2005).   
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6. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
6.1 Results Summary  
Most decision models focus on the role of expected value (e.g., Ahn et al., 2008; 
Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev & Roth, 1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Sutton & Barto, 
1998). The present work investigated the role of frequency information in experience-
based decision-making. In Study 1, the EFP models which accounts for decision maker’s 
reliance on frequency information were developed. In different decision-making tasks 
and on various model performance criteria, the EFP models consistently performed well 
and often outperformed other models without the frequency value component. Also, in 
the experimental studies (Studies 2 - 4), the EFP model also performed better than other 
models. Together, these results suggest a crucial role of frequency information and the 
pervasiveness of the frequency heuristic in experience-based decision-making. Studies 2 
and 3 provided evidence that working memory (WM) plays an important role in the use 
of the frequency heuristic. Study 3 further showed that at least one role of WM is to 
contribute towards making accurate gain-loss frequency judgments, which forms a basis 
of applying this heuristic. Study 4 revealed a life-span trajectory of the use of the 
frequency heuristic, that is, people tend to utilize the frequency heuristic more with 
advancing age.  
6.2 Why a Frequency Heuristic?  
This work (especially Study 1) provides evidence for the prevalence of the 
frequency heuristic in experience-based decision-making, even when it is 
disadvantageous (e.g., in the SGT). Four reasons might account for the pervasiveness. 
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First, frequency information is critical in a variety of human behavior and people are 
highly sensitive to this information (e.g., Sedlmeier, 2002; Zacks & Hasher, 2002). 
Second, the frequency of gains and losses (and of other task features such as 
improvements and decrements in payoff) is salient in most of experience-based decision-
making contexts. Third, as the naming of frequency heuristic suggests, it is a simplified 
strategy that ignores part of the information (e.g., the magnitude of gains and losses). 
People use it attempting to reduce effort despite its modest demands on WM (see 
discussions in 6.3). Fourth, while this heuristic is counterproductive in some tasks such 
as the SGT where the reward structure was designed to be so in order to examine the 
contributions of expected value versus gain-loss frequency, in real life the frequency 
heuristic could be efficient. Some prior work indicates the efficiency of a similar 
frequency heuristic. Dawes (1979) proposed Dawes’s rule which sums up the number of 
pieces of positive evidence and subtracts the number of pieces of negative evidence, 
sharing the idea of the frequency heuristic formalized in this work7. Another study 
compared the predictive accuracy of Dawes’s rule with multiple regression and found 
that this frequency-based simple rule performs better than multiple regression in some 
situations and not largely inferior in other situations (Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & 
Goldstein, 1999; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975). For instance, when the cues or pieces of 
                                                 
7 The frequency tracking mechanism specified in the EFP model is similar to Dawes’s rule. The difference 
is that the Dawes’s rule simply tallies up the number of positive versus negative attributes and does not 
assume a memory decay mechanism since it is used to model description-based decision-making where all 
the attributes information is presented to decision makers all at once, while the frequency tracking function 
proposed in the current work is used to model experience-based decision making where positive and 
negative outcomes are gained gradually across the task.   
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evidence are highly correlated, Dawes’s rule exhibits more accurate prediction. Hence a 
frequency-based strategy can be more efficient than a statistics-based strategy.  
6.3 WM Demands of the Frequency Heuristic and Dual-Process Models 
My studies that manipulated WM load provided evidence that using the 
frequency heuristic demands WM resources. What seems contradictory is that older 
adults with age-related cognitive decline were more likely to use the frequency heuristic. 
These seemingly contradictory results might suggest that WM is necessary to utilize the 
frequency heuristic but its demand is not heavy to the degree that diminished working 
memory capacity (WMC) in older adults constrains the utilization of this heuristic. The 
characterization of being WM-demanding makes the current results relevant to the dual-
process models, which are popular in cognitive and social psychology and often used to 
account for various types of higher cognition such as judgment, decision-making, 
reasoning, and social cognition (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Kahneman & Frederick, 2007; 
Schneider & Schiffrin, 1977; for a review, see Evans, 2008). Despite numerous 
differences, these dual-process models have in common the distinction between two 
cognitive systems, here referred to as, System 1 and System 2 (Kahneman & Frederick, 
2007). System 1 involves cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, unconscious, 
implicit, requiring low effort, independent of WM, and being default process. In 
contrast, System 2 entails cognitive processes that are slow, deliberative, conscious, 
explicit, require high effort, limited by WM, and inhibitory. It appears that the frequency 
heuristic shares some features of processing in both Systems 1 and 2, but is also 
dissimilar with other features of processing in each system.  
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Utilizing the frequency heuristic is limited by WM to a degree that concurrent 
WM demanding operations limit the use of it, which is a characteristic of System 2 
processing. Like other heuristics, however, the frequency heuristic ignores part of the 
information (e.g., the gain and loss magnitude of an outcome) and is used for effort 
reduction, which seems to contradict the analytic and deliberative nature of System 2 
processing. Another interesting phenomenon is that this heuristic appears to be a default 
choice for decision makers with intact WM resources even in a task where it is 
disadvantageous, but they could intervene the use of it and switch to a strategy based on 
expected value (single task participants in Study 2 and participants in Study 4). This 
process is the line with Evans’s view (2008) on the relationship between Systems 1 and 
2 (he called it default-interventionist; see Kahneman & Frederick, 2007 for a similar 
idea). In their terms, the phenomenon above can be described as: System 1 controls 
one’s action according to a default choice (the frequency heuristic) unless System 2 
detects an error or inefficiency and hence inhibits the default response. This view links 
the frequency heuristic to System 1.  
Given the “irregular” position of the frequency heuristic on the map of the two 
systems, it seems to suggest a continuum nature of various dimensions of cognitive 
processes, in contrast to qualitative dichotomies assumed by dual-process models. For 
instance, WM demands of the frequency heuristic is medium, not either completely 
effortless or highly effortful. Also, this heuristic is based on a simple rule, not either 
associative or analytic. Two previous theories also share the notion of continua along 
aspects of cognitive processes (Hammond, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2002). Dual-process 
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models provide a powerful framework to explain a wide range of psychological 
processes such as affect-based versus logic-based strategies (Evans, 2008), but the idea 
of continuum allowing for a “in-between” positions might be more effective in 
describing some phenomena such as the frequency heuristic. 
On a relevant note, Hasher and Zacks (1984) examined frequency processing 
under an automatic and effortful processing framework and viewed it as an automatic 
process. Previous research (e.g., Maki & Ostby, 1987; Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 
1986) and the present work both provide evidence that WM load diminishes frequency 
judgment accuracy. This work also uncovers an association between WMC and 
frequency judgment accuracy in a word frequency judgment task and decision-making 
task. These findings all speak against the automatic view on frequency processing. 
Considering some evidence that intention, age, and verbal ability do not influence 
frequency judgment accuracy, this work takes the same continuum view as above for 
general frequency processing, that is, it has a medium demand on WM.  
6.4 Strategy use under a Single Task versus Dual Task Condition 
In this work, I assumed that participants under WM load might track expected 
values through implicit processes, as suggested by prior work (Otto et al., 2011; Worthy 
et al., 2012). In fact, much evidence suggests that a prediction error, the difference 
between the outcome received and the expected value for a given option, is tracked by 
the ventral striatum, a subcortical region implicated in implicit, procedural learning (e.g., 
Hare, O’Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 2008; Pessiglione, Seymour, Flandin, 
Dolan, & Frith, 2006). In many popular RL models, including models used in this work 
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(see Equations 2 and 9), these prediction errors are used to update the expected value for 
the option that was chosen on each trial (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Sutton & Barto, 
1998; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005). Given the ability of subcortical regions to track 
expected value, people may be able to implicitly learn the expected value of options 
(although it is unclear about how accurate the learned expected values are when 
participants are under WM load). In short, dual task participants may make choices 
based on implicitly-tracked expected values, which are supposed to require little effort.  
This work argues that one reason that single task participants use the frequency 
heuristic as a “default” strategy is because this heuristic ignores part of the information 
(e.g., magnitude of the gains and losses from an outcome) and hence utilizing it can 
reduce effort compared to other deliberative strategies. If so, why did single task 
participants not use the strategy employed by dual task participants? That should save 
much more effort. There are two conjectures. First, single task participants had access to 
the implicitly tracked expected values but were deeply uncertain regarding the validity 
of the expected values since they had no explicit access to how these values were 
learned. A choice of strategies or heuristics is considered as a result of an accuracy-
effort-trade-off (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). 
According to this view, because of great uncertainty about the accuracy of implicitly-
learned expected values, single task participants did not use the implicit-processing-
based strategy. Second, they might even have no conscious access to the expected values 
(both the learning process and learned outcome). In this case, dual task participants 
might make choices based on gut feelings which might in turn be informed by 
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implicitly-tracked expected values, such as “Hmm, I feel Deck A is good. Pick it!” If 
this is the case, the strategy used by dual task participants involved more uncertainty 
about its validity than in the first possibility. Single task participants would still not use 
expected value information because of uncertainty. Instead, the accuracy-effort-trade-off 
led to the frequency heuristic which seems to be valid in some real-life situations 
(Czerlinski et al., 1999; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975) and is not highly effortful. Moreover, 
the salience of the relative frequency of gains versus losses encourages the use of this 
heuristic. Exploiting the trade-off idea further, this work argues that single task 
participants might give up the frequency heuristic and attempt to track expected values 
somewhat explicitly (implicitly-tracked expected values might facilitate this explicit 
process) when they discover that utilizing the frequency heuristic is inefficient.  
To answer the question of why single task participants did not employ the 
strategy used by dual task participants, two strong assumptions are made: 1) having no 
conscious access to the learning processes of expected values leads to one’s great 
uncertainty regarding their accuracy; 2) people under WM load have no explicit access 
to learned expected values but just have some gut feelings which might be based on 
expected values. Future work might test these assumptions to understand the exact 
mechanisms of the choice of strategies by decision makers with intact WM resources. 
6.5 Implications  
6.5.1 Implications on Decisions from Experience 
The predominance of the frequency heuristic may shed new light on a general 
finding in decisions from experience, that is, underestimation of rare events (Barron & 
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Erev, 2003; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). Based on the findings from the 
current work, one possibility is that decision makers tend to use the frequency heuristic 
which engenders a behavioral pattern as if they underestimate rare events. For instance, 
in a choice problem in which one option yields 32 dollars with a probability of 2.5% and 
0 dollars otherwise while choosing the other option produces 3 dollars with a probability 
of 25% and 0 dollars otherwise (32, .025 versus 3, .25). Hertwig and colleagues (2004) 
found that 88% of participants selected the option yielding rewards more frequently (3, 
.25) despite the sub-optimality of this option in this problem. This is a task of the 
minimal information paradigm. Study 1 results support the use of the frequency heuristic 
in this type of tasks. Hence, it is likely that most participants attentively track the 
frequency of rewards and choose the option with more frequent rewards but assign little 
attention to expected values. Although other mechanisms have been extensively studied 
(e.g., Rakow, Demes, & Newell, 2008; Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009; for a 
review, see Hertwig & Erev, 2009), for example, reliance on small samples or weighting 
functions, future work may particularly examine the role of the frequency heuristic in 
explaining the underestimation of rare events and its associations with other 
mechanisms. 
6.5.2 The EFP Models 
In this work, the EFP models were developed to parsimoniously capture three 
critical sources of choice behavior in decision-making tasks like the IGT and SGT: 
expected value, frequency of gains versus losses, and perseveration. The EFP models 
consistently performed well in a variety of tasks and on different performance criteria. 
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Given the validity of the EFP models, they have the potential to contribute to future 
research in providing a richer description of choice behavior and its underlying 
psychological processes such as attention to gain-loss frequency. For example, prior 
work has observed impaired performance in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) among 
patients with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) deficits (Fellows & Farah, 2005; 
Manes et al., 2002), but has not revealed its mechanisms. Future research using 
computational models such as the EFP model for the IGT may pinpoint the detailed 
mechanisms that are disrupted by DLPFC damage. 
6.5.3 Availability Heuristic and Frequency Heuristic 
The EFP models assume that decision makers track the frequency of gains and 
losses. However, the availability heuristic, a much studied heuristic in the behavioral 
economics literature, assumes that frequency judgment is based on the ease of recalling 
relevant instances rather than tracking the frequency information per se (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). It is illustrated by asking participants to estimate the frequency of 
names. Participants were presented a list consisting of 19 names of very famous men 
(e.g., Richard Nixon) and 20 names of less famous women (e.g., Lana Turner). 
Participants were then asked to write down as many as names as they could recall from 
the list or to judge whether the list contained more names of men or women.  They found 
that participants recalled more names from the famous names than from the less famous 
names, and made incorrect judgment of relative frequency (i.e., more names of men). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) explained that this was because famous names are easier 
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to recall and frequency judgment of an event is based on the ease with which instances 
of that event come to mind.  
Although this theory is popular, the frequency processing literature has much 
evidence speaking against it. First, the availability heuristic holds that frequency 
judgment is generally biased. However, in the frequency judgment literature, studies 
which exhibited biased frequency judgments are rare. Most studies provide evidence that 
people can make valid frequency estimates, either frequency of everyday life events 
(e.g., Lichtenstein et al., 1978; Shapiro, 1969) or of events in laboratory settings (e.g., 
Hintzman & Block, 1971; Mutter & Goedert, 1997). Second, the availability heuristic 
assumes that recall is the basis of frequency judgment. However, numerous studies 
indicate that frequency judgment is independent of recall (e.g., Bruce, Doyle, Dench, & 
Burton, 1991; Freund & Hasher, 1989). Taken together, people appear not to greatly rely 
on the ease of recall to make a frequency judgment. Instead, people track the frequency 
of events, as assumed in the EFP models, which forms the basis of frequency judgment. 
Also, the specification of the frequency tracking mechanism assumed in the EFP models 
can easily accommodate the “famous names” effect by allowing for different decay 
parameters to track the frequency of famous names and less famous names. As such, the 
frequency value of famous names might decay slower than that of less famous names, 
resulting in a higher estimate for the famous names.   
6.6 Limitations and Future Directions  
Some limitations of this work are already discussed in previous sections. For 
instance, this work did not provide an exact answer about why single task participants 
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did not use the strategy employed by dual task participants. Proposed reasons can be 
tested in future work.  
Another unanswered issue is about the exact mechanisms of strategy switching. 
This work argues that people can change decision strategies during the task such as 
switching from a frequency-based strategy to an expected-value-based strategy. 
However, the exact mechanism of strategy switching is still unclear. It is evident that a 
primary goal of decision-making research is to help people make better decisions. 
Understanding the process that people change decision strategies from disadvantageous 
to advantageous ones is critical to reach the goal. According to the default-
interventionist dual-process theory (Evans, 2008; Kahneman & Frederick, 2007), 
detecting inefficiency of the current strategy and inhibiting the use of it is responsible for 
strategy switching. Future work may follow this argument to examine this issue. For 
instance, do metacognitive monitoring and/or inhibitory control lead to effective strategy 
switching? Also, future work might consider other factors that can come into play. In 
this work, unlike single task participants in Study 2 (and participants in Study 4), single 
task participants in Study 3 failed to reach similar performance level as dual task 
participants. I explained that this might be attributed to diminished motivation because 
of a semester timing effect (Nicholls et al., 2015). Future work may investigate how 
motivation shapes strategy switching.   
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